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For approximately forty-three days in early 2016, a very public and legally
contentious dispute waged between Apple Inc. (“Apple”) and the Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) regarding data encryption and privacy interests of electronic
devices versus law enforcement and national security needs to search an iPhone.1
Each party publicly, and through multiple court filings,2 argued their polar

* Ms. Julia P. Eckart, USAF Civilian Attorney, B.A. Economics, Mount Holyoke College
(1985); J.D., Emory University School of Law (1989). Ms. Eckart is a member of the
Florida Bar. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the
views of the United States Government, Department of Defense, or United States Air Force.
Elizabeth Weise, Apple v FBI timeline: 43 days that rocked tech, USA TODAY (Mar. 15,
2016, 6:26 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/03/15/apple-v-fbitimeline/81827400.
2
Id. Although numerous amicus briefs were filed, this Article primarily focuses on the
1
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positions as to the validity of a court order, issued pursuant to the All Writs Act3
(“AWA”), requiring Apple to provide technical assistance to allow the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) to access the iPhone’s encrypted data. On one
hand, the DOJ argued the court’s order was authorized and appropriate; on the
other hand, Apple argued the court exceeded its authority when it ordered Apple
to provide the described technical assistance in violation of statutory law, the
separation of powers doctrine, and various provisions of the U.S. Constitution
(“Constitution”). This ping-pong-like debate between the two parties made it
difficult to determine what was truly required of Apple, whether it was legally
appropriate, and who had the stronger legal position. In the end, the court
vacated the order because the DOJ provided notice to the court that it had been
able to access the iPhone.4 However, the issue of data encryption and privacy
interests of electronic devices versus national security and law enforcement’s
need to search electronic devices is still unresolved. This Article is an attempt to
objectively examine and assess each party’s legal arguments concerning the
court’s use of the AWA to order Apple to provide the technical assistance and
identify any areas that may need further explanation before a final determination
can be made.5

I. THE FACTS UNDERLYING THE DOJ–APPLE DISPUTE
On December 2, 2015, after pledging allegiance to Khalifa bu bkr al
bhaghdadi al quraishi, a reference to Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, leader of the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-sham (“ISIS”), Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife,
Tafsheen Malik Farook (“Mali”), went to the Inland Regional Center (“IRC”),
his place of employment, with two assault rifles and semiautomatic handguns.6
parties’ court-filed documents.
3
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2015).
4
Order Vacating February 16, 2016 Order at 1, In re the Search of an Apple iPhone
Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California
License Plate #[3]5KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2016) (No. 16-10) [hereinafter Final
Order].
5
As there was no final court decision on the legal dispute before the court, this Article
is based upon Apple Inc.’s (Apple’s) and the Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) court-filed
documents and publicly available information.
6
Gov’t’s Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Declaration of Christopher Pluhar; Exhibt
Memo at 2, In re Matter of the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a
Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 19, 2016) (No. 16-10) [hereinafter Application]; Declaration of Christopher Pluhar at 2,
In re the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a
Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) (No. 1610) [hereinafter Pluhar Declaration].
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They walked into a conference room where his co-workers were attending a
holiday luncheon/training session, and opened-fire, killing 14 people and
injuring 22 others.7 Malik and Farook were killed later that day in a shoot-out
with law enforcement.
At the time, the December 2, 2015 attack was “the deadliest Islamic Stateinspired attack on American soil,”8 resulting in an FBI investigation. By
December 3, 2015, the FBI had obtained a Search and Seizure Warrant, based
upon probable cause, from Magistrate Judge David T. Bristow authorizing the
FBI to search and seize a “Black Lexus IS300 California license plate
#5KGD203, [35KGD203] . . . vehicle identification number
JTHBD192X50094434” and various items found in the vehicle to include digital
devices.9 The subsequent FBI search located an Apple digital device,
specifically an “iPhone 5C, Model: A1532, P/N: MGFG2LL/A, S/N:
FFMNQ3MTG2DJ, IMEI: 358820052301412, on the Verizon Network”10
(“Device”).
Farook’s employer, the San Bernardino County Department of Public Health
(“SBCDPH”), owned the Device and provided it to him for business purposes.
While the SBCDPH gave the FBI permission to search the iPhone (and
permission for Apple’s technical assistance), the Device was passcode protected
and the SBCDPH did not know the passcode.11 The SBCDPH also owned the
Device’s corresponding iCloud account, and even though the SBCDPH did not
know the iCloud account password, it had the ability to reset the password.12
According to FBI Supervisory Special Agent (“SSA”) Christopher Pluhar, the
FBI found the Device powered off inside of the vehicle. When the Device was
Application, supra note 6; Pluhar Declaration, supra note 6.
Michael S. Schmidt & Richard Pérez-Peña, F.B.I. Treating San Bernardino Attack as
Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/us/
tashfeen-malik-islamic-state.html.
9
Application, supra note 6, at 1 (The majority of the court-filed documents have
“35KGD203” as the license plate number versus “#5KGD203.” Although it cannot be
conclusively determined, this appears to be a typographical error, with the inadvertent use of
the shift key when typing the number “3”.).
10 Id.
11 Gov’t’s Motion to Compel Apple Inc. to Comply with this Court’s February 16, 2016
Order Compelling Assistance in Search; Exhibit at 18 n. 7, In re Matter of the Search of an
Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300,
California License Plate 35KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2016) (No. 16-10) [hereinafter
Motion to Compel]; Pluhar Declaration, supra note 6, at 3.
12 Motion to Compel, supra note 11; Supplemental Declaration of Christopher Pluhar in
Support of Gov’t’s Reply in Support of Motion to Compel and Opposition to Apple Inc.’s
Motion to Vacate Order at 1-2, In re the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the
Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate
35KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2016) (No. 16-10) [hereinafter Pluhar Supplemental
Declaration].
7
8
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powered on, it displayed a four-digit pad (indicating a four-digit passcode) and
was running iOS9, an operating system for Apple’s mobile devices.13 Although
the SBCDPH had deployed the mobile device management system (“MDM”) to
manage its employee-issued iPhones, the MDM system had not been fully
implemented at the time and so was not yet installed on Farook’s Device.14 The
MDM system would have enabled the SBCDPH to “enroll iOS devices in an
enterprise environment, wirelessly configure and update settings, monitor
compliance with corporate policies, and even remotely wipe or lock managed
devices.”15 Thus, had the MDM been implemented on his Device, the SBCDPH
would have had the ability to clear the passcode and unlock the iPhone.16
The FBI faced numerous issues related to the examination of the Device. First,
the FBI did not know or have access to the passcode.17 Not only was the FBI
faced with a large iteration count, it also had to manually, rather than
electronically, enter the passcodes.18 In addition, Apple’s iPhone operating
system (“iOS”) allowed the user to implement an “‘auto-erase function’ that
would, if enabled, result in the permanent destruction of the required encryption
key material after ten erroneous attempts at the passcode.”19 The FBI had reason
to believe the function was enabled as the SBCDPH stated the Device had been
provided to Farook with the function enabled. In addition, the most recent
examination of the device’s corresponding iCloud account indicated the autoerase function was enabled.20 Thus, the FBI concluded it risked permanent
inaccessibility to the data in the iPhone after ten erroneous passcode attempts as
the auto-erase function would erase the encryption key needed to access the
encrypted data.21
Given these concerns and the impact to its ability to access the data, the FBI

13 Gov’t’s Reply in Support of Motion to Compel and Opposition to Apple Inc.’s
Motion to Vacate Order at 1-2, In re the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the
Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate
#[3]5KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2016) (No. 16-10) [hereinafter Opposition]; Pluhar
Supplemental Declaration, supra note 12.
14 Pluhar Supplemental Declaration, supra note 12.
15 iOS Security, iOS9.0 or later, APPLE INC. 1, 52 (Sept. 2015).
16 Id.
17 Application, supra note 6, at 3.
18 A large iteration count makes each passcode attempt slower. As a result, “it would
take years to try all combinations of a six-character alphanumeric passcode.” Id. at 5.;
Pluhar Declaration, supra note 6, at 3; Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling
Apple Inc. to Assist Agency in Search, and Opposition to Government’s Motion to Compel
Assistance at 6, In re the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a
Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 25, 2016) (No. 16-10) [hereinafter Motion to Vacate].
19 Application, supra note 6, at 3.
20 Id. at 6.
21 Id.
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sought Apple’s technical assistance to disable certain non-encrypted security
features within the device’s operating system.22 The FBI first sought Apple’s
voluntary technical assistance, which was provided on a limited basis; however,
Apple denied the FBI’s request to disable various non-encrypted security
features23 and/or refused to discuss disabling the non-encryption security
features24 which led to this public and legally contentious dispute between Apple
and the DOJ.
A. Timeline of the Parties’ Court-Filed Documents
Subsequent to Apple’s denial to voluntarily disable the non-encryption
features, the DOJ filed the Government’s Ex Parte Application for Order
Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search (“Application”) on February
16, 2016 with the United States District Court for the Central District of
California. The Application included SSA Pluhar’s Declaration and the courtissued search warrant relied upon by the FBI. The Application requested the
court to order Apple, pursuant to the AWA,25 to provide technical assistance to
the FBI to access the Device’s encrypted data.26
That same day, Magistrate Judge Sherri Pym signed the Order Compelling
Apple, Inc. to Assist Agents in Search (“Order”). The Order required Apple to
provide reasonable technical assistance such that it would accomplish the
following:
(1) Disable the auto-erase function whether it was enabled or not;
(2) Allow the FBI to electronically submit passcodes (via some other
physical device port, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, or any other protocol
available on the device); and
(3) Permit the FBI to enter passcodes in a manner such that the
software would not intentionally add delay times between passcodes
attempts beyond that which is incurred by Apple hardware.27
The Order also included the DOJ’s proposed course of action demanding Apple
provide the FBI a custom signed iPhone Software (“IPSW”) file, and a recovery
bundle or some other Software Image File (“SIF”) that could be loaded on the
Id.
Id. at 5.
24 Opposition, supra note 13, at 21.
25 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2015).
26 Application, supra note 6, at 1.
27 Order Compelling Apple, Inc. to Assist Agents in Search at 2, In re the Search of an
Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300,
California License Plate 35KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) (No. 15-0451M) [hereinafter
Order].
22
23
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device. The SIF would load and run from Random Access Memory (“RAM”) so
that the device would remain forensically sound. Per the DOJ, because the SIF
would create a unique identifier, it would only load and run on the device. The
SIF would bypass the auto-erase function; allow the FBI to input passcodes
electronically; and remove various time delays.28 The SIF could be installed at
a government facility or an Apple facility; however, a government representative
would electronically enter the passcodes.29 Apple was ordered to provide the
DOJ Apple’s reasonable costs for the technical assistance.30 Finally, the Order
gave Apple the flexibility to develop other options for achieving the FBI’s stated
goals, subject to the DOJ’s agreement.31
In response to the Order, Tim Cook, Apple’s Chief Executive Officer,
published an on-line notice entitled, A Message to Our Customers (“Message”)
where Apple indicated it would legally challenge the Order’s validity, and
outlined its policy reasons for challenging the United States Governments
(“Government’s”) actions.32
On February 19, 2016, the DOJ filed the Government’s Motion to Compel
Apple Inc. to Comply with this Court’s February 16, 2016 Order Compelling
Assistance in Search (“Motion to Compel”).33 Apple’s Message was an exhibit
to the Motion to Compel. Then, on February 25, 2016, Apple filed Apple Inc.’s
Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search and
Opposition to Government’s Motion to Compel Assistance (“Motion to
Vacate”).34 Apple also filed two Declarations, one signed by Erik
Neuenschwander, Manager of User Privacy,35 and one signed by Lisa Olle,
Manager of Global Privacy & Law Enforcement Compliance Team.36
Id.
Id. at 2-3.
30 Id. at 3.
31 Id.
32 Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE INC. (Feb. 16, 2016),
http://www.apple.com/customer-letter.
33 Weise, supra note 1.
34 Id.
35 As the manager of User Privacy, Erik Neuenschwander is “responsible for the privacy
design of Apple’s products and services” and provides many of the technical details about
the Device. See Declaration of Erik Neuenschwander in Support of Apple’s Motion to
Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search, and Opposition to
Government’s Motion to Compel Assistance at 3-4, In re the Search of an Apple iPhone
Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California
License Plate 35KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016) (No. 16-10) [hereinafter
Neuenschwander Declaration].
36 Lisa Olle is responsible for Apple’s compliance with legal requests from
international, federal, state and local law enforcement agencies; she was also responsible for
Apple’s response to the legal requests for information concerning the Device at issue. See
Declaration of Lisa Olle in Support of Apple’s Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling
Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search and Opposition to Gov’t’s Motion to Compel
28
29
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In response to the Motion to Vacate, the DOJ filed the Government’s Reply
in Support of Motion to Compel and Opposition to Apple Inc.’s Motion to
Vacate Order (“Opposition”).37 The DOJ attached Declarations to the
Opposition signed by SSA Pluhar,38 Stacey Perino (a FBI Electronics
Engineer),39 and Assistant U.S. Attorney Tracy Wilkison (concerning accuracy
of DOJ’s submitted exhibits).40
On March 15, 2016, Apple filed Apple Inc.’s Reply to Government’s
Opposition to Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to
Asist Agents in Search (“Reply”).41 Apple also filed additional Declarations
signed by Nicola Hanna (concerning accuracy of Apple’s submitted exhibits),42
Craig Federighi, Senior Vice President of Software Engineering, Robert
Ferrini,43 Senior Director of Worldwide Advertising & Planning, and Erik
Neuenschwander.44
B. Issues Presented in the DOJ- Apple Litigation
After reviewing the court-filed documents, it is reasonable to assume that the
DOJ did not foresee the issues that would arise in this case, including the court’s
authority to issue the Order pursuant to the AWA. However, Apple raised a
number of complex, and to an extent, overlapping issues. Between the parties’
respective positions outlined in the court documents, the dispute presents the

Assistance at 2, In re the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a
Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 25, 2016) (No. 16-10) [hereinafter Olle Declaration].
37 Weise, supra note 1.
38 Pluhar Supplemental Declaration, supra note 12, at 1.
39 Declaration of Stacey Perino in Support of Gov’t’s Reply in Support of Motion to
Compel and Opposition to Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order at 1, In re the Search of an
Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300,
California License Plate #[3]5KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2016) (No. 16-10) [hereinafter
Perino Declaration].
40 Supplemental Declaration of Tracy Wilkinson in Support of Gov’t’s Reply in Support
of Motion to Compel and Opposition to Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order at 1, In re the
Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black
Lexus IS300, California License Plate #[3]5KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2016) (No. 16-10)
[hereinafter Wilkinson Supplemental Declaration].
41 Weise, supra note 1.
42 Apple Inc.’s Reply to Government’s Opposition to Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate
Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search at 1-2, In re the Search of an Apple
iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300,
California License Plate 35KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2016) (No. 16-10) [hereinafter
Reply].
43 Id.
44 Id.

2019]

Encryption: Privacy versus National Security

9

following issues:
(1) Does this case pertain to a single iPhone or all iPhones?
(2) Does the Order compel Apple to create a universal master key or
back door or require Apple to hack its own customers?
(3) Did the court exceed its jurisdictional authority when it issued the
Order pursuant the AWA?
(4) Did the court appropriately use the AWA when it ordered Apple
to provide the mandated technical assistance?
(5) Does the Order violate Apple’s First Amendment rights?
(6) Does the Order implicate anyone’s Fourth Amendments rights?
(7) Does the Order violate an individual’s or individuals’ right to
privacy?
(8) Does the Order violate Apple’s Fifth Amendment rights?
However, before examining these issues, one must first have an understanding
of Apple’s iOS, including aspects of its architectural hardware, software and
data encryption, and non-encryption security features.
II. APPLE’S IOS9.0 SECURITY GUIDE
The Device in this case operated on iOS9.0, Apple’s iOS Security, iOS9.0 or
later45 guidebook (“iOS9.0 Security Guide”) will be used as a reference of the
device’s encryption and non-encryption security features.46 Based upon the
review of Apple’s iOS9.0 Security Guide, it is clear Apple is extremely
concerned with the security lifecycle of all of its manufactured devices. Apple
states, “[e]very iOS device combines software, hardware, and services [that are]
designed to work together for maximum security . . . iOS protects not only the
device and its data at rest, but the entire ecosystem, including everything users
do locally, on networks, and with key Internet services.”47 The encryption and
non-encryption security features built into all levels of Apple’s devices, e.g., the
hardware, firmware, software, processes, updates, apps, etc. are consistent with
Apple’s mission to protect its users’ privacy.
A. Some of Apple’s Encryption and Non-Encryption Security Features
One of Apple’s encryption features, “Data Protection,” is designed to protect
data stored in the flash memory of the iPhone48 which ensures a high level of

iOS9.0 Security Guide, APPLE INC. 1, 1 (2015).
Motion to Vacate, supra note 18 (beginning with iOS8, Apple began to incorporate
passcodes into its encryption systems).
47 iOS9.0 Security Guide, supra note 45, at 4.
48 See Jeff Tyson, How Flash Memory Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, https://computer.
howstuffworks.com/flash-memory.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2019) (explaining data is
45
46
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encryption of the user’s data. When the user sets up the iPhone’s passcode, the
Data Protection encryption feature is automatically enabled, and the user’s data,
including the user’s Messages, Mail, Calendar, Contacts, Photos, Health Data
are automatically encrypted.49 The data is encrypted through a combination of a
user-determined passcode (either a four to six numeric combination or a six
alphanumeric combination) and a unique 256-bit Advanced Encryption
Standard (“AES”) key, referred to as the Unique ID (“UID”). The UID/AES
256-bit key is fused into an iPhone during its manufacture and neither Apple nor
its suppliers know the UID/AES 256-bit key nor can the iPhones’ software or
firmware read the UID.50 Upon set up, the user’s passcode becomes entangled
with the iPhone’s UID; thus the stronger the passcode, the stronger the
encryption key.51 Finally, because the passcode becomes entangled with the
UID, brute force attempts can only be manually entered into the iPhone.52
One of Apple’s non-encryption security features, the large iteration count,
also discourages brute force attempts on iOS9.0 as each subsequent passcode
entered into the device is slowed, ensuring that it would take five to six years to
try all combinations of a six-character alphanumeric passcode (using upper and
lower case letters). The iteration count is calibrated so that one attempt takes
approximately 80 milliseconds. As a result of the increased computational
burden after each unsuccessful attempt, each subsequent passcode entry to
access the iPhone becomes slower as the computational burden for each entry is
increased after each attempt.53
Another non-encryption security feature which discourages brute force
attempts is escalating time delays between incorrect passcode entries. For the
first four attempts, there would be no time delay; however, for the fifth attempt
there would be a 1-minute delay, for the sixth attempt, a 5-minute delay, for the
seventh and eighth attempt, a 15-minute delay, and a 1-hour delay after the ninth
attempt.54 In addition, after a certain number of incorrect attempts, the time delay
is set to an infinite value that results in the device not accepting any more

stored electronically as opposed to being stored in a computer hard drive).
49 iOS9.0 Security Guide, supra note 45, at 11-12.
50 See id. at 10-12; Motion to Vacate, supra note 18; Pluhar Declaration, supra note 6,
at 5.
51 See iOS9.0 Security Guide, supra note 45, at 12; see also Motion to Vacate, supra
note 18, at 6; Neuenschwander Declaration, supra note 35.
52 iOS9.0 Security Guide, supra note 45, at 12; see also Neuenschwander Declaration,
supra note 35.
53 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18; see also Neuenschwander Declaration, supra note
35.
54 iOS9.0 Security Guide, supra note 45, at 12; see also Neuenschwander Declaration,
supra note 35, at 6.
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passcodes, thereby making the data permanently inaccessible.55
Finally, Apple has installed an auto-erase feature, called “Erase Data,” which
if activated would delete encrypted data after ten consecutive, incorrect passcode
entries.56 This setting is also available as an administrative policy through the
MDM.57
B. Other Hardware and Software System Security Features
According to Apple’s iOS9.0 Security Guide, everything within Apple’s iOS
is designed to ensure only authorized/signed Apple products, processes, code,
devices etc. can operate on Apple’s iOS. From the initial booting of the device
(e.g. beginning with the Apple root certificate) to software upgrades to apps
loaded on the device, there is some level of verification and/or trust certification
to ensure the security of the electronic device. Because only Apple products can
run Apple’s iOS and only Apple-signed code can run on Apple devices, only
Apple can prevent any downgrading to an iOS through a process called System
Software Authorization.58
Apple is able to prevent the downgrading of its iOS through the procedures
required for updates to its devices. For example, during an iOS update, the
device will connect to an “Apple installation authorization server and sends it a
list of cryptographic measurements for each part of the installation bundle to be
installed (for example, LLB, iBoot, the kernel, and OS image), a random antireply value (nonce), and the device’s unique ID ECID.”59 It is important to note
the unique ID ECID is different from the UID, the 256-bit AES Key. The ECID
is a 64-bit AES key tied to a particular model60 (e.g. an iPhone model) while the
256-bit AES Key is particular to each individual device. To prevent the
downgrade, Apple’s authorization server will check:
the presented list of measurements against versions for which
installation is permitted and, if it finds a match, adds the ECID to the
measurement and signs the results. The server passes a complete set
of signed data to the device as part of the upgrade process. Adding
the ECID ‘personalizes’ the authorization for the requesting device .
. . These steps ensure that the authorization is for a specific device
and that an old iOS version form one device can’t be copied to

Neuenschwander Declaration, supra note 35, at 4.
See Motion to Vacate, supra note 18 (stating the position of the DOJ that it deletes
the encryption key making the data inaccessible).
57 iOS9.0 Security Guide, supra note 45, at 12; see also Neuenschwander Declaration,
supra note 35, at 4.
58 iOS Security, iOS9.0 or later, supra note 15, at 6.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 58.
55
56
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another. The nonce prevents an attacker from saving the server’s
response and using it to tamper with a device or otherwise alter the
software system.61
Overall, Apple and the DOJ agree upon the fundamental encryption and nonencryption security features articulated in Apple’s iOS9.0 Security Guide. Apple
and the DOJ also agree on the following matters regarding the impact the trust
certification steps have on iPhones: only Apple devices can run Apple’s iOS;
only Apple-signed code can run on Apple devices; and one cannot downgrade
the iOS. The parties are in disagreement over the Order’s impact to Apple’s iOS
and whether those changes are personalized to only one device.62
III. DOES THIS CASE PERTAIN TO A SINGLE IPHONE OR ALL
IPHONES?
The DOJ consistently argues this case is about a single iPhone and that it is
the iPhone specifically described in the Order. Apple strongly disagrees with the
DOJ’s position. In fact, Apple’s first sentence in its Motion to Vacate is “[t]his
is not a case about one isolated iPhone.”63 Apple consistently argues what the
government is mandating through the Order will significantly impact millions
of Apple iPhones. Which party is correct? The answer is both, depending on
one’s perspective; however, while each perspective may be reasonable, one must
examine that perspective according to the law in order to determine its validity.
A. DOJ’s Position–It is About One, Single iPhone
Through the Order filed pursuant to the AWA and the government’s
Application, the DOJ informed the court that the FBI had obtained a specific
device via a valid search warrant.64 The Application also informed the court that
although Apple had provided some assistance to the FBI (e.g., complied with
valid subpoenas for account information, participated in telephone calls), Apple
declined to voluntarily assist them in disabling various security features,
resulting in its need for the Order. As written, the Application pertains to a single
Apple iPhone, specifically, “iPhone 5C, Model: A1532, P/N: MGFG2LL/A,
S/N: FFMNQ3MTG2DJ, IMEI: 358820052301412, on the Verizon Network”65
On February 16, 2016, Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym signed the Order directing
Id. at 6.
See infra text accompany notes 111–126; see also Perino Declaration, supra note 39,
at 17-30.
63 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 1.
64 Final Order, supra note 4, at 1.
65 Id.
61
62
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Apple to provide the FBI technical assistance, as described in the Order,66 for
one phone, identified as “a cellular telephone, Apple make: iPhone 5C, Model:
A1532,
P/N:
MGFG2LL/A,
S/N:
FFMNQ3MTG2DJ,
IMEI: 358820052301412, on the Verizon Network.”67 Thus, given the specific
wording of the Application and Order, the DOJ’s perspective is reasonable.
The same day the Order was signed, Apple issued its Message68 outlining
Apple’s objections to the Order. Although only a DOJ exhibit, the message
foretells Apple’s future legal arguments that the Order would affect the privacy
and security of millions of iPhones users and the Government was requiring it
to create a backdoor and/or something equivalent to a master key.69
On February 19, 2016, the DOJ filed its Motion to Compel given Apple’s
“stated interest in adversarial testing of the order’s legal merits, [and] . . . to
provide Apple with the due process and adversarial testing it seeks.”70 In its
Motion to Compel, the DOJ repeats many of its arguments outlined in its
Application, primarily focusing on how the requirements of the AWA are met.
The DOJ summarizes its single, isolated iPhone argument as
the Order is tailored for and limited to this particular phone. And the
Order will facilitate only the FBI’s efforts to search the phone; it does
not require Apple to conduct the search or access any content on the
phone. Nor is compliance with the Order a threat to other users of
Apple products. Apple may maintain custody of the software, destroy
it after its purpose under the Order has been served, refuse to
disseminate it outside of Apple, and make clear to the world that it
does not apply to other devices or users without lawful court orders.
As such, compliance with the Order presents no danger for any other
phone.71
As to Apple’s public position, the Order requires Apple to write code to create
a backdoor, a master key or hack its own customers. The DOJ simply denies
these allegations.72

See supra text accompany notes 26-31.
Gov’t’s Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search at 1, In re the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search
Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16,
2016) (No. 15-0451M) [hereinafter Ex Parte Application].
68 Cook, supra note 32.
69 Id.
70 Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 3 n.3, In re the Search of an Apple iPhone
Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California
License Plate 35KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2016) (No. 16-10) [hereinafter Memorandum].
71 Id. at 14-15.
72 Id. at 2 (citing Cook, supra note 32).
66
67
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B. Apple’s Position—It is About Millions of iPhones
On February 25, 2016, Apple responded to the DOJ’s Motion to Compel with
its Motion to Vacate, and its first sentence was “[t]his is not a case about one
isolated iPhone.”73 Apple views this case as law enforcement and national
security interests versus all iPhone users’ privacy and security interests.74 And,
because the privacy and security interests of all iPhone users are at stake, this
case is about millions of iPhones. Apple cites numerous articles and statements
where other government attorneys have filed applications for similar orders in
various jurisdictions. Additionally, Apple cites state and local officials who have
publicly stated they intend to follow similar procedures to search hundreds of
seized iPhones obtained through standard law enforcement investigations, as
opposed to only terrorism cases.75
Apple’s perspective is reasonable. In fact, if the Order is determined to be
valid under the AWA, one could anticipate law enforcement agencies pursuing
this same avenue of assistance in the future. Although Apple’s position is
reasonable, this case’s impact is no different from any other case that would
impact future prosecutions and decisions. And, each future individual request
for an AWA order would still require judicial supervision and while the initial
order may be issued ex parte, that entity will also have the ability to challenge
that order in any future case. In addition, if the underlying order is supported
with a court-ordered, probable cause search warrant, there are at least two levels
of judicial oversight of the government’s actions.
C. DOJ’s Opposition and Apple’s Reply
In its March 10, 2016, Opposition, the DOJ repeated many of its arguments.
The Order applies to a single iPhone, which provides flexibility for Apple; it
does not compel Apple to unlock other iPhones, nor create a backdoor or a
master key.76 In fact, it requires only the development of “a narrow, targeted
piece of software capable of running on just one iPhone, in the security of
Apple’s corporate headquarters.”77 In Apple’s March 15, 2016 Reply, Apple
again argued the case is not about one, single iPhone nor is it modest given the
potential impact on other iPhones.78
In both its Motion to Vacate and its Reply, Apple argues that if the
73
74
75
76
77
78

Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 1.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 3, 24; Olle Declaration, supra note 36, at 4.
Opposition, supra note 13, at 1.
Reply, supra note 42, at 1.
Id.
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Government requires this information through a court order, it is only a matter
of time before foreign governments require the same assistance from Apple.
Alternatively, the DOJ contends if Apple chooses to do business in another
country, it voluntarily agrees to comply with that country’s laws.79 Both parties
have reasonable positions. However, Apple appears to inconsistently defend the
privacy and security of its clients depending on the country of its users. Apple’s
iOS9.0 Security Guide demonstrates Apple’s commitment to privacy and
security of its devices. Apple’s own website also posts its belief that “privacy is
a fundamental human right.”80 However, Apple has a unique way of protecting
privacy and security interests in China when it places all the data on a server
operated by a government-owned company, China Telecom.81 Apple responds
to the DOJ’s argument with the following:
Apple has never built a back door of any kind into iOS, or otherwise
made data stored on the iPhone or in iCloud more technically
accessible to any country’s government. The government is wrong
in asserting that Apple made ‘special accommodations’ for China, as
Apple uses the same security protocols everywhere in the world and
follows the same standards for responding to law enforcement
requests.82
Most attorneys will agree words are important. Therefore, one must examine
Apple’s word choice of “more technically accessible.”83 This does not mean the
Chinese government does not have access to the data on the server. Many are
also skeptical of Apple’s privacy position in China.84 In addition, while Apple
Opposition, supra note 13, at 26.
Apple products are designed to protect your privacy, APPLE, INC.,
https://www.apple.com/privacy (last visited Mar. 29, 2019).
81 Opposition, supra note 13, at 29 (discussing Apple’s response that the data is
encrypted, while foreign analysts are skeptical that Apple is not required to share the data
with the Chinese Government); see Scott Cendrowski, Apple’s recent concession in China
have a pattern, FORTUNE (Oct. 13, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/10/13/apples-recentconcessions-in-china-have-a-pattern/ (discussing Apple’s response that the data is
encrypted, while foreign analysts are skeptical that Apple is not required to share the data
with the Chinese Government); Hauke Johannes Gieror, Cyber Security in China: Internet
Security, Protectionism and Competitiveness: New Challenges to Western Businesses,
MERICS CHINA MONITOR (Apr. 2015), https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/201709/China_Monitor_22_Cybersecurity_EN.pdf.
82 Reply, supra note 42, at 21.
83 Cendrowski, supra note 81 (describing that Apple agreed to cooperate with security
assessments by the Chinese government, suggesting technical accessibility by the Chinese
government).
84 See Stephen Nellis & Cate Cadell, Apple moves to store iCloud keys in China, raising
human rights fears, REUTERS (FEB. 24, 2018, 12:14 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uschina-apple-icloud-insight/apple-moves-to-store-icloud-keys-in-china-raising-human-rightsfears-idUSKCN1G8060; see generally Cendrowski, supra note 81; Gieror, supra note 81;
David Pierson, While it defies U.S. government, Apple abides by China’s orders—and reaps
big rewards, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/
79
80
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may follow Apple’s standards for processing all law enforcement requests, not
all country judicial standards for issuing orders to access one’s iPhone are the
same.85 Therefore, Apple may have never “made data stored on the iPhone or in
iCloud more technically accessible,” one cannot simply conclude a foreign
government does not have access to data stored on the iPhone, or in iCloud.86
Overall, each party’s position is reasonable; however, the DOJ has the
stronger legal position as the Order applies to the single iPhone described in the
Order. While Apple’s position is reasonable, the fact that a particular case may
impact other cases is not an earthshattering legal concept to attorneys. Each
future case would still only be decided on the facts presented in that specific case
and not on hypotheticals.87 For there is “[n]o principle . . . more fundamental to
the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional
limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.”88 It is
also logical that if this Order is determined to be valid under the AWA, other
applications would be made in the future. However, the issuance of a future order
via the AWA would still be subject to judicial scrutiny and the opportunity to
challenge that particular order would still exist.
IV. DOES THE ORDER COMPEL APPLE TO CREATE A BACKDOOR, A
MASTER KEY OR SOMETHING EQUIVALENT TO A MASTER KEY,
AND IF SO, WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS?
The DOJ and Apple have polar answers as to whether Apple is required to
create a backdoor. Apple argues the Order requires it to create a backdoor or
something equivalent to a master key to its iOS. As firmly as Apple is set in its
position, so is the DOJ in its belief that Apple is not required to create a backdoor
and/or master key. What is interesting about each party’s position is that neither
entity provides a definition for a backdoor, nor a master key in their respective
motions, and appear to argue from each party’s own understanding of the terms
but not conclusively known to the other.89
In attempting to answer the question presented, the definitions of the terms
technology/la-fi-apple-china-20160226-story.html; Heather Timmons, Apple is reportedly
giving the Chinese government access to its devices for “security checks”, QUARTZ (Jan. 23,
2015), https://qz.com/332059/apple-is-reportedly-giving-the-chinese-government-access-toits-devices-for-a-SECURITY-assessment.
85 Yoko Kubota, Apple’s China Lesson: Think Different, But Not Too Different, WALL
STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 26, 2018, 6:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/apples-chinalesson-think-different-but-not-too-different-1519642914.
86 Reply, supra note 42, at 21.
87 See generally Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 412 (2013).
88 See id. at 408.
89 See generally Motion to Compel, supra note 11; Motion to Vacate, supra note 18.
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required in order to determine the Order’s impact to Apple’s iOS should be
considered. However, there does not seem to be a universally accepted definition
of backdoor in the digital world. In fact, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence does not even have a definition
for backdoor.90 Rather, there are various definitions of backdoor which have
developed over time,91 with a common understanding that a backdoor in the
digital world describes the means of bypassing a computer system’s security
protocols in order to access the computer system.92
The term master key seems to have a more accepted definition. For example,
the Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security defines master key as a
cryptographic key “whose sole purpose is to protect other keys.”93 Its application
is a
cryptographic key (typically a symmetric key) . . . whose sole
purpose is to protect other keys, such as session keys, while those
keys are in storage, in use, or in transit. This protection may take one
of two forms: the master keys, may be used to encrypt the other keys,
or the master key may be used to generate other keys.94
Thus, the question presented becomes whether Apple’s modifications to iOS
(what Apple calls Gov’s95 and the DOJ calls SIF96) allow the DOJ the ability to
access the encrypted data on this one, single iPhone through a backdoor and/or
equivalent to a master key for all other iPhones (requiring no changes to
GovtOS/SIF); or would the new GovtOS/SIF have to be modified to unlock
another iPhone, be it the same model or different models, and what is the extent
90 See Kim Zetter, HACKER LEXICON: WHAT IS A BACKDOOR?, WIRED (Dec. 11,
2014, 6:35AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/12/hacker-lexicon-backdoor.
91 Back door can be defined as a “general term describing a mechanism or access point
in a communications device or network that enables. the creator of software or hardware
with access to date without the permission or knowledge of the user.” Stephanie K. Pell,
Jonesing for a Privacy Mandate, Getting a Technology Fix-Doctrine to Follow, 14 N.C. J.
OF LAW & TECH. 489, 532 (2013); Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and
Globalization, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 416, 460 (2012); Christopher Soghoian,
Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Government Back Doors in the 2.0 Era, 8 J.
ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 359, 399-400 (2010) (providing an example of FBI creating
a software, “Magic Lantern” tool to steal information from suspect’s computers without a
warrant).
92 See Encyclopedia, Backdoor Definition, A DICTIONARY OF COMPUTER,
http://www.encyclopedia.com/computing/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-pressreleases/backdoor (last visited Mar. 25, 2019); Margaret Rouse, Backdoor Definition
(computing), TECHTARGET, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/back-door (last
visited Mar. 25, 2019); Jonathon Zdziarski, Backdoor, A Technical Definition, ZDZIARSKI’S
BLOG OF THINGS (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?p=6077 (discussing the
need for a common understanding of backdoor in a digital world); Zetter, supra note 90.
93 Master Key, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRYPTOGRAPHY AND SECURITY (2d ed. 2005).
94 Id.
95 See Neuenschwander Declaration, supra note 35, at 4.
96 See Application, supra note 6, at 7.
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of those modifications? If those modifications are minor, is this two steps away
from a backdoor or “equivalent to a master key?”97
A. DOJ’s Position–There Is No Mandate to Create a Backdoor or a Master Key
The DOJ preemptively filed its Motion To Compel given Apple’s public
position that it would legally challenge the Order.98 In its motion, the DOJ
repeats many of its arguments outlined in its Application. The primary focus of
this motion is how the requirements authorizing third party assistance via the
AWA, which are outlined in United States v. New York. Telephone Co.99 (“N.Y.
Telephone Co.”), have been met. The DOJ strongly denies Apple’s allegation
that the Order requires Apple to write code to create a backdoor or a master key,
or hack its own customers. More specifically, the DOJ argues the Order does not
provide hackers and criminals access to all iPhones, nor does it require Apple to
search or access the device or hack or decrypt its customers’ iPhones. It also
does not compromise the security of personal information of Apple products;
and “does not give the government ‘the power to reach into anyone’s device’
without a warrant or court authorization . . . [nor] does [it] compromise the
security of personal information.”100 The Order allows Apple to maintain or
destroy GovtOS/SIF (for the Government never needs to possess
GovtOS/SIF),101 and gives Apple flexibility to develop other options. In sum,
“compliance with the Order presents no danger for any other phone and is not
‘the equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions or
locks.’”102
While the DOJ denies Apple’s allegations in its motion, the DOJ fails to
provide an explanation as to how the newly written code to disable the nonencryption security features is not a backdoor or a master key to Apple’s iOS.
At this point in the litigation, this is a flaw in the DOJ’s position and one that
must be addressed in this case and in future cases.

Motion to Compel, supra note 11, at 14; Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 7.
Motion to Compel, supra note 11, at 3 n.3 (This article does not examine the DOJ’s
preemptive filing).
99 United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 169 (1977).
100 Krishnadev Calamur, Apple vs. the FBI: The Justice Department Fires Back, THE
ATLANTIC (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2016/02/apple-fbisan-bernardino/470169/.
101 Motion to Compel, supra note 11.
102 Id. at 15.
97
98
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B. Apple’s Position–It is a Mandate to Create a Backdoor and/or a Master Key
In its Motion to Vacate, Apple argues “[t]he government demands that Apple
create a back door to defeat the encryption on the iPhone”103 and “[t]he order
demanded by the government compels Apple to create a new operating system—
effectively a ‘back door’ to the iPhone—that Apple believes is too dangerous to
build.”104 The focus is on Apple’s choice of words to describe the Government’s
actions, e.g. requiring it to create a backdoor,105 effectively create a backdoor,106
or something equivalent to a master key.107 However, because Apple does not
provide a definition of backdoor or master key, one cannot conclusively evaluate
its position. In addition, Apple’s use of phrases “effectively create a back door”
or “equivalent to a master key,” gives Apple flexibility to maneuver around the
terms “backdoor” and “master key”. In other words, Apple is not required to
meet a definition, yet may still obtain the benefits of the negative inference of
the terms.
Apple also argues that it not only needs to write new code, but also disable
existing code in order to remove the non-encryption security features and add a
capability to the new iOS (GovtOS/SIF) so that passcodes can be electronically
inputted into the device.108 Thus, creating a new software system designed to
defeat Apple’s security features.109 However, Apple fails to fully address
whether GovtOS/SIF will work only on this particular device or whether it
requires some modification to work on the same iPhone model and/or all
iPhones, and if so, how significant will the modification need to be in order for
it to work on the same iPhone model and/or all iPhones.
This failure to explain whether GovtOS/SIF will require any modification,
and the extent of any such modification, is a potential flaw for Apple. As
Mr. Neuenschwander implies, some modification to GovtOS/SIF would need to
be made so that it can be used on other iPhones. He states,
if Apple receives three orders a week similar to the one here from
around the United States, the entire process described above—
writing, validating, executing, and then completely destroying the
code—will have to happen three times every week, week in and week
out. Each such commissioned operating system will need to be
tailored to the specific combination of hardware and operating
system running on the relevant device.110 [Emphasis added.]
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 2, 13.
See Neuenschwander Declaration, supra note 35, at 10.
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To what extent does Apple have to tailor GovtOS/SIF to run on another relevant
device? What is a relevant device? These are unknowns that must become
known as they are critical to answering the question of whether Apple is being
required to create a backdoor or something equivalent to a master key, i.e., is
GovtOS/SIF two-steps away from a backdoor or master key?
C. DOJ’s Opposition Position
In its March 10, 2016 Opposition, the DOJ’s position remained the same: the
Order is written to “produce a narrow, targeted piece of software capable of
running on just one iPhone, in the security of Apple’s corporate HQs.”111 More
importantly, the DOJ explains how a master key or backdoor cannot be created,
something it failed to address in its Motion to Compel. According to the DOJ,
GovtOS/SIF can only be used on the one device, and is not a master key because:
[t]he software ‘will be coded by Apple with a unique identifier of the
phone so that the [software] would only load and execute on the [ ]
DEVICE.’ . . . A ‘unique ID (ECID)’ associated with each physical
iPhone is incorporated into the phone’s operating system. ‘Adding
the ECID ‘personalizes’ the authorization for the requesting device.’
Apple has designed its phones so that every operating system must
pair with the phone’s ECID. ([Declarations] describing how the
Apple server ‘adds the ECID’ before it ‘signs’ the iOS to be used for
the upgrade.) The operating system and ECID must correspond for
the operating system to work. The ordered software [GovtOS/SIF]
would rely upon the same limitation.112
The DOJ also argues GovtOS/SIF could not be modified to run on other
iPhones as GovtOS/SIF would not be released to the government or anyone else;
and even “if the code were modified to run on a phone with a different ECID, it
would lack a valid digital signature. Without that signature, the code would not
run at all on any iOS phone with intact security.”113 To support its statement, the
DOJ included Stacey Perino’s Declaration114 which outlines the DOJ’s technical
explanation as to why GovtOS/SIF would only work on a specific device. Mr.
Perino’s explanation relies heavily upon the ECID, a device’s unique ID.
According to Mr. Perino, “[t]he ECID is a unique, device-specific identifier
programmed in the phone hardware during manufacture. ECID [is defined] as
‘a 64-bit identifier that’s unique to the processor in each iOS device. Used as

111
112
113
114

Opposition, supra note 13, at 1.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 29.
An Electronics Engineer with the FBI.
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part of the personalization process, it’s not considered a secret.’”115 In its March
15, 2016 Reply, Apple states that “Mr. Perino’s characterization of Apple’s
process . . . is inaccurate.”116 However, before addressing Apple’s Reply, one
must examine Mr. Perino’s explanation of Apple’s process.
According to Mr. Perino, when a device requires an iOS update, it connects
to an approved conduit (e.g., iTunes) and provides certain information to the
conduit including the device’s ECID, a nonce117 and other cryptographic
measurements. The conduit then forwards this information to an Apple server
where it builds a software package, e.g. the iOS update, and digitally signs it
using its private key. The public key is in the device’s Read Only Memory. The
digital signature includes the ECID, the nonce and the cryptographic
measurements originally received from the device. When the device receives the
returned package (via the conduit), the device verifies the digital signature to
ensure that the package is meant for that device (comparing the ECID, nonce
and other cryptographic measurements sent to that received). Thus, the device is
able to determine whether an older iOS system is being loaded and would not
load the package if it were an older system.118
Mr. Perino then discusses Apple’s code signing process of including the ECID
into the digital signature to the device in issue. If the iOS update process occurs
as described in the preceding paragraph, “the [GovtOS/]SIF could incorporate
the ECID of the Subject Device, and then be signed by Apple . . . [I]f the ECID
of the [GovtOS/]SIF were changed to the ECID of another device, the signature
check would fail and an Apple device would not load the code.”119 Therefore,
the GovtOS/SIF directed in the Order can run only on the specific device; and
its creation, “tailored and signed with the unique identifier of the Subject Device,
[the ECID] would not undermine the security of other iPhones that also require
Apple-signed code, because each iPhone has its own unique identifier.”120
Although Mr. Perino explains that the GovtOS/SIF will load on only one device,
there appears to be least one issue with his explanation, and that is the ECID is
not limited to a single, specific device.
The ECID, the 64-bit identifier that is unique to the processor in each iOS
device, referred to as the device’s unique ID in the Perino Declaration as well as
in Apple’s iOS9.0 Security Guide 121 is not the same as the device’s unique ID
(“UID”), the 256-bit key that is fused into the individual device during the
manufacturing process (not known to Apple, its suppliers or even the
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

See iOS9.0 Security Guide, supra note 45, at 58.
Reply, supra note 42, at 19.
A random, one-time-use value. See iOS9.0 Security Guide, supra note 45, at 6.
See id. at 10-12.
See id. at 6.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 6.
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software/firmware within the device) and ultimately becoming entangled with
the passcode.122 The confusion may have occurred because Apple uses the term
unique ID with the ECID as well as unique ID (“UID”) to describe the 256-bit
AES encryption key in its iOS9.0 Security Guide. Apple also uses the term
“personalizes” (or “personalization”) with the term “ECID”123 which implies the
ECID is unique/personal to the individual device. However, the ECID is unique
to the processer in each iOS device, and thus would be unique to the processers
within the same iPhone model.124
D. Apple’s Reply to the DOJ’s Opposition
In Apple’s Reply, it disputes the DOJ’s explanation as to why GovtOS/SIF
will only run on the single device and argues GovtOS/SIF could be modified to
run on other phones.125 Mr. Neuenschwander also explains why Mr. Perino’s
iOS update explanation is inaccurate.
Each time Apple releases a new operating system, that operating
system is the same for every device of a given model. The operating
system then gets a personalized signature specific to each device.
This personalization occurs as part of the installation process after
the iOS is created.
Once GovtOS[/SIF] is created, personalizing it to a new device
becomes a simple process. If Apple were forced to create
GovtOS[/SIF] for installation on the device at issue in this case, it
would likely take only minutes for Apple, or a malicious actor with
sufficient access, to perform the necessary engineering work to
install it on another device of the same model.126 [Emphasis added.]
The critical question is then, how slight or significant the modification is such
that GovtOS/SIF can be installed on another device. While Apple states it would
only be minutes, thus implying little modification is required, it is unknown
precisely what modifications are required. It is also unclear as to whether the
modification is limited to specific models, such as “5Cs” or is broader and would
include all model “5s.”

See id.at 10.
Id. at 6.
124 See id.
125 Reply, supra note 42, at 19; Supplemental Declaration of Erik Neuenschwander in
Support of Apple Inc.’s Reply in Support of Motion to Vacate Order Compelling apple Inc.
to Assist Agency in Search at 6, In re the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the
Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate
35KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2016) (No. 16-10) [hereinafter Neuenschwander
Supplemental Declaration].
126 Neuenschwander Supplemental Declaration, supra note 125.
122
123
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Apple uses phrases “equivalent to a master key,” “create a back door” or “in
effect, create a back door.”127 Given the definition of master key,128 if some
modification is required, Apple has not been ordered to create a master key for
all its iPhones; however, Apple uses terms “equivalent to a master key,”129
thereby allowing Apple to argue the negative effects of being ordered to create
a master key, without having to meet a definition of master key.
As to whether the DOJ is ordering Apple to create a backdoor, given the lack
of a precise definition, it is more difficult to answer this question. If one accepts
the general concept of what a backdoor means in the computer world and one
assumes that the backdoor must be standard for all devices, one must then
conclude that Apple is not being ordered to create a backdoor as it will require
some level of modification in order for GovtOS/SIF to be installed on other
devices.
Because the terms are not defined in their respective documents, it cannot be
determined whether Apple is truly required to create a master key (or something
equivalent to one), a backdoor, or something two-steps away from a master key
or backdoor. However, in future cases, one must closely examine Apple’s choice
of terms/phrases as well as focus on how much of a modification is required, and
its impact to what iPhone models.
E. Is Apple Being Ordered to Hack its Customers?
Initially, in its Message, Apple states, “[t]he government is asking Apple to
hack our own users.”130 In its Motion to Compel, the DOJ subsequently denies
Apple’s public position and argues the Order “does not require Apple to ‘hack
[its] own users’”131 nor is it “a ‘hack’ to all of Apple’s encryption software.” 132
Then, in Apple’s Motion to Vacate and Reply, Apple modifies its public position
of hacking its own customers by arguing the Government will have the ability
to hack into iPhones once it has the ability to access the iPhone 5C used by one
of the attackers through a court order.133 Apple also additionally argues that the
court did not properly analyze N.Y. Telephone Co.’s factors to determine
whether the AWA could be used to compel third parties (e.g. Apple) to hack into
iPhones or whether this hacking would adversely affect its interests.134
Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 2-3.
See supra text accompany note 93.
129 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 3.
130 Cook, supra note 32.
131 Memorandum, supra note 70, at 2.
132 Pluhar Supplemental Declaration, supra note 12, at 2.
133 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 2; see Reply, supra note 42, at 5.
134 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 28 (discussing the factors of N.Y. Telephone
Co.’s like whether the All Writs Act could be used to compel third parties to hack into
127
128
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In order to answer the question whether the Order requires Apple to hack
iPhones or is being ordered to hack its customers, one must again know the
definition of the term “hack” and the term “hacker.” Similar to the terms
“backdoor” and “master key”, both parties fail to provide a definition for the
term “hack.” Rather, they appear to argue their own nefarious understanding of
such terms.
Over time the terms “hacker” and “hack,” and their meanings have not only
changed but have multiplied.135 According to Jessie Sheidlower, president of the
American Dialect Society, the terms early references to machines “share a
relatively benign sense of ‘working on’ a tech problem in a different, presumably
more creative way than what’s outlined in an instruction manual.”136 It was not
until the 1960s that the terms “hack” and “hacker” were incorporated into the
vocabulary of computer enthusiasts.137 The Jargon File has eight definitions for
the term “hacker,” and only one of the definitions (the last definition) has a
nefarious/malicious intent, and that definition is “[deprecated] A malicious
meddler who tries to discover sensitive information by poking around”138
Interestingly, the first definition is “A person who enjoys exploring the details
of programmable systems and how to stretch their capabilities, as opposed to
most users, who prefer to learn only the minimum necessary.’”139
Like “hacker,” the term “hack” also has multiple definitions that also are not
nefarious except for it being an abbreviated term for “hacker.”140 In spite of the
mostly benign definitions, over time, most individuals have come to understand
the term “hack” to mean malicious meddling. In addition, the use of adjectives
are now associated with hackers, e.g., white hat hackers (free-spirited creation),
black hat hackers (malicious meddling).141 However, in spite of the general
acceptance of the terms’ negative inferences, computer enthusiasts still use the
term very differently, at least according to Ben Yagoda of The New Yorker. For,
“[e]ven as the mainstream usage of ‘hacker’ took on its darker connotation, the
geeks [have] continued using it to mean what it always had: a righteous dude.”142
In the DOJ–Apple dispute, Apple again focuses on the Government’s future,
phones, whether the cellphone company was “too far removed” from the matter, or whether
hacking into the phone adversely affected the company’s interests.).
135 Ben Yagoda, A Short History of “Hack”, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 6, 2014),
https://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/a-short-history-of-hack.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 See Hack, THE JARGON FILE, http://catb.org/jargon/html/H/hack.html (last visited Feb.
7, 2018).
141 Yagoda, supra note 135.
142 Id.
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hypothetical actions that would still be subject to judicial review. Next, even if
one were to accept the nefarious inference of the term “hack” (or “hacker”), is
one really a malicious meddler looking for sensitive information (or even
someone creatively exploring the computer’s capabilities) when a court has
ordered a search, based upon probable cause, and/or the owner of the iPhone has
consented to the search as well as to Apple’s technical assistance? One would
think not. Rather, Apple again appears to use terms without meeting their
definitions, and still obtains the benefits of the terms’ negative inference.

V. DID THE COURT EXCEED ITS JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
WHEN IT ISSUED THE ORDER PURSUANT TO THE ALL WRITS ACT?
Apple argues the Order violates the Constitution as the court exceeded its
constitutional authority and violated the separation of powers doctrine when it
issued the Order pursuant to the AWA. Apple’s jurisdictional arguments include
the applicability of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act143
(“CALEA”)144 to the issue before the court, Congress’ and the Executive
Branch’s decisions to not pass legislation mandating decryption, and the
political question of the issue before the court. Each is an independent basis
demonstrating a court’s overreach. The DOJ disagrees with Apple’s positions
and argues the court was within its constitutional authority to issue the Order
pursuant to the AWA.
A. The Court’s Jurisdiction and Its Relationship to the AWA
Establishing the Judicial Branch, Article III of the Constitution states, “[t]he
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”145 The First Congress subsequently established the federal judicial
system pursuant to the Judiciary Act of 1789,146 which also included the original
AWA. Today, the AWA states, “The Supreme Court and all courts established
by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”147
While the statute is straight forward, each party has its own perspective as to the
court’s jurisdictional authority to issue the Order pursuant to the AWA.

143
144
145
146
147

47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2015).
Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 9.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2015).

26

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 27.2

However, before examining each party’s perspective, there are two important
principles of the AWA as it relates to a court’s jurisdictional authority.
The first fundamental principle of the AWA is that “it neither enlarges nor
expands jurisdiction of the court; it may be invoked only to aid jurisdiction
which the Court already has.”148 Thus, a court may not use the AWA to extend
its authority into areas where it otherwise does not have jurisdiction.149 A second
principle of the AWA is that it “is a residual source of authority [for courts] to
issue writs that are not otherwise covered by statute. “Where a statute
specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it is that authority, and not the
All Writs Act, that is controlling.”150 When analyzing the court’s authority to
issue an AWA order, rather than examining the court’s initial jurisdictional
authority relied upon (i.e. the search warrant), perhaps it is more efficient to first
ask whether there is a statute that specifically addresses the particular issue at
hand. Then, if another statute (e.g., CALEA) is controlling, the court’s use of
the AWA to issue the Order to Apple would not be authorized and no further
legal analysis would be required.
B. Is There a Statute that Specifically Addresses the Particular Issue Presented
in the DOJ–Apple Dispute?
Apple believes CALEA is a statute that specifically addresses the particular
issue at hand because:
Congress, through CALEA, specified when a company has an
obligation to assist the government with decryption of
communications, and made clear that a company has no obligation
to do so where . . . the company does not retain a copy of the
decryption key. Congress . . . opted not to provide authority to
compel companies like Apple to assist law enforcement with respect
to data stored on a smartphone they designed and manufactured.151
Not surprisingly, the DOJ’s position is CALEA does not “‘specifically
address’—or even vaguely address—the duty of Apple to assist in extracting
data from a passcode-locked cell phone in order to permit the government to
execute a validly issued search warrant.”152 Again, polar positions which can be
reduced to the following questions: What does CALEA apply to? Data in
motion? Data at rest? If only to data in motion, what intercepted communications
are to be decrypted?
148
149
150
151
152

U.S. v. Hall, 583 F.Supp. 717, 718 (E.D. Va. 1984).
Id.
PA Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshall Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985).
Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 8.
Motion to Compel, supra note 11, at 22.
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The DOJ correctly argues that this case is about data at rest (i.e. stored data)
and not the interception of data within a communication. CALEA relies upon
definitions in the Wiretap Act,153 which applies to information acquired during
the transmission of a communication and not to stored information, therefore,
CALEA is inapplicable.154 The DOJ emphasizes CALEA requirements that
telecommunications carriers retain the capability to comply with court orders for
real-time interceptions (data in motion) and outlines what telecommunication
carriers must do, in advance of court orders, to ensure their systems can isolate
information to allow for the real-time interception of network
communications.155 In this DOJ–Apple dispute, the FBI is not requiring
assistance for the decryption of data in motion, but decryption of the device’s
stored data. Thus, CALEA is inapplicable.
In both its Motion to Vacate and Reply, Apple cites a statute that pertains to
the interception of communications (data in motion) yet then concludes that
Congress chose not to apply CALEA’s requirements to data in storage.
However, Apple fails to provide any logical analysis as to how it reaches this
conclusion. Apple simply makes general statements similar to the following:
“CALEA defines the circumstances under which private companies must create
systems to assist law enforcement in its investigatory efforts, as well as the
circumstances where such providers are not and cannot be required to build
programs and systems to enable law enforcement access.”156 This statement is
accurate at least with regards to when private companies are required to assist
law enforcement with the interception of communications, data in motion.
Regarding the DOJ’s argument of CALEA’s applicability to the data in
motion versus data at rest, Apple fails to address this argument in either its
Motion to Vacate or its Reply. For instance, Apple cites to In re Order Requiring
Apple Inc., to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by This Court
where the Government raised the data in motion versus data at rest argument and
lost on that issue.157 Apple simply references the case as legal support for a court
finding the government’s use of the AWA to require Apple’s decryption
assistance was improper.158
Although Apple fails to reference this case for a court’s rejection of the data
at rest argument, the court’s reasoning in rejecting the argument must be
examined. The court wrote,
The proposition that CALEA makes a distinction between data ‘at
rest’ and ‘in motion’ is largely correct as far as it goes, but ultimately
153
154
155
156
157
158

18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 (2016).
See Motion to Compel, supra note 11, at 22-23.
Opposition, supra note 13, at 12.
Reply, supra note 42, at 7.
In re Apple, Inc., 149 F.Supp.3d 341, 355 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 22.

28

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 27.2

misses the point. Even if Congress did not in any way regulate data
‘at rest’ in CALEA, it plainly could, and did, enact such legislation
elsewhere. See e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(1) (requiring ‘[a] provider of
wire or electronic communication services or a remote computing
service, upon request of a governmental entity, [to] take all necessary
steps to preserve records and other evidence in its possession pending
the issuance of a court or other process.’)159
Interestingly, the court’s data at rest reference is to the Stored Communication
Act160 (“SCA”), which outlines the responsibilities entities must comply with
when preserving stored data. In addition, if the government wishes to access
stored data, the SCA generally requires the government to obtain a search
warrant.161 Thus, the court’s reasoning appears to be circular as the SCA does
not address the issue of encrypted stored data or CALEA. If the SCA requires a
search warrant in order to access stored data (assuming all other SCA
requirements have been met),162 the question still remains whether it is
permissible to use the AWA to require third party (i.e. Apple’s) assistance in
accessing the encrypted stored data.
Finally, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, the Wire and Electronic Communications
Interception and Interception of Oral Communications Act, commonly referred
to as the Wiretap Act, provides guidance concerning the enforcement of
CALEA. When one examines Section 2522 of the Wiretap Act, Enforcement of
the CALEA, it references 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (Chapter 119, the Wiretap
Act), a State statute, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and 18
U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (Chapter 206), use of pen registers or trap and trace
devices,163 i.e., generally statutes pertaining to data in motion. The enforcement
provision does not reference the SCA164 nor does the SCA reference CALEA.
Thus, one may conclude that CALEA, with its own enforcement provision, does
not implicate or apply to stored data.
When examining Apple and the DOJ’s arguments, the DOJ has the stronger
argument that CALEA is inapplicable to the Order issued pursuant to the AWA
as CALEA applies to the interception of digital (and other) communications
(data in motion) and not to stored data (data at rest).

In re Apple, Inc., 149 F.Supp.3d at 355-56.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2016).
161 Id. at § 2703(b)-(d).
162 A discussion on the Stored Communication Act (“SCA”) could be a separate article.
The intent is simply to show how circular the court’s logic/argument was with its reference
to the SCA and the SCA’s requirement for a search warrant.
163 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127.
164 See id. § 2522.
159
160
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C. The Court’s Underlying Authority to Issue the Order Pursuant the AWA
The issue in the DOJ-Apple dispute highlights how the courts utilized the
AWA to issue the Order. In the DOJ–Apple dispute, as in United States v. N.Y.
Telephone Co.,165 the court’s underlying authority was based upon a probable
cause search warrant.166 The DOJ consistently argues this same authority in its
Motion to Compel and Opposition.167 Other cases where the court’s underlying
authority to issue a valid AWA order based upon a probable cause search warrant
include Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States,168 In re Application of the
United States,169 In re Order XXX, Inc.,170 In re Application of the United States
for Order Directing Access to Videotapes,171 and United States v. Hall.172 Thus,
there is ample case law which supports the court’s authority to issue an order
requiring third party assistance to effectuate and prevent the frustration of an
order it had previously issued and was based upon jurisdiction it otherwise
possessed. In other words, issuance of an order allows the government to execute
a search warrant.
In past cases where Apple was not a party to the litigation, Apple has
responded to AWA orders issued “to facilitate the execution of search warrants
on Apple devices running on earlier versions of iOS”173 which would have been
to access unencrypted data in iPhones.174 Apple also acknowledges compliance
with these past orders.175 This history shows Apple recognized a probable cause
search warrant as a court’s authority to issue an AWA order. If one has accepted
United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
Id. at 168-69.
167 Motion to Compel, supra note 11, at 7-10; Opposition, supra note 13, at 8, 13.
168 Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1977)
(finding that when the government sought a search warrant for a wiretap based on an FBI
agent’s information of an illegal gambling business, there was sufficient probable cause).
169 In re Application of the United States America for an Order Directing a Provider of
Comm. Serv. to Provide Tech. Ass. To Agents of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 128
F.Supp.3d 478, 484 (D.P.R. 2015) (stating that even though the government had not sought
a warrant, there was sufficient probable cause established with an affidavit by a DEA agent).
170 In re Order Requiring XXX, Inc., 14 Mag. 2258, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154743, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (ordering a company to attempt to unlock a cell phone because the
government had established probable cause and obtained a search warrant for the phone).
171 In re Application of the United States for Order Directing Access to Videotapes, No.
03-89, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15227, at *1 (D. Md. Aug. 22, 2003) (finding that the
government did not need a court order to review the surveillance footage of an apartment
complex because there was no expectation of privacy and the order to force the complex to
produce the footage is not burdensome since the agents can review the footage at the
complex with the complex’s equipment).
172 United States v. Hall, 583 F.Supp. 717, 717 (E.D. Va. 1984).
173 Motion to Compel, supra note 11, at 2; Opposition, supra note 13, at 6, 28.
174 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 2, 28-29; Neuenschwander Declaration, supra
note 35, at 6.
175 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 28-29.
165
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a search warrant as a basis for a court’s underlying authority to issue an order
against a third party for technical assistance under the AWA, the issue becomes
focused as to whether the court exceed its authority under the AWA as a court
may not impose unreasonable burdens on Apple.176
D. Apple’s Other Jurisdictional Arguments
Apple makes a number of other arguments challenging the court’s jurisdiction
and alleging the court violated the separation of powers doctrine and crossed
into legislating. These arguments include expanding sub rosa the scope of
CALEA obligations to Apple through the Order; updating, repurposing and/or
reinventing the statute; and imposing CALEA requirements upon it even when
Congress chose not to update CALEA and the Executive Branch chose not to
proceed with CALEA II, which would have mandated backdoors for encrypted
communications.177
Focusing again on CALEA, Apple argues that it does not meet the definition
of a telecommunications provider, but rather meets the definition of an
information service provider, and Congress excluded information service
providers from CALEA’s requirements. In addition, CALEA prohibits the
government from “dictat[ing] to providers of electronic communications
services or manufactures of telecommunications equipment any specific
equipment design or software configuration.”178 And, even if Apple was a
covered telecommunication provider, which Apple does not concede, CALEA
“does not require covered telecommunication carriers . . . to be responsible for
‘decrypting, or ensuring the government’s ability to decrypt, any
communication.”179 Whether Apple meets the definitions under CALEA is
immaterial because CALEA is inapplicable to the specific issue of third party
assistance for accessing stored, encrypted data. The Order was issued in
accordance with the AWA based upon the underlying court’s authority to issue
a probable cause search warrant and not pursuant to CALEA. As such, the focus
of the Order’s validity and whether the court exceeded its authority should be
based upon N.Y. Telephone Co.’s three-prong analysis.180
Apple also argues the court exceeded its authority, and improperly crossed
into the role of legislating by repurposing and reinventing CALEA to meet the
evolving needs of society. Apple further argues, only Congress “has authority

176
177
178
179
180

See United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172-73 (1977).
See Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 8-9, 18.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174-75.
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‘to update’ a ‘technologically antiquated’ statute ‘to address the new and rapidly
evolving era of computer and cloud-stored, processed and produced data.’”181
Like Apple’s CALEA definitions’ argument, Apple’s repurposing and
reinventing a statute argument is simply misplaced. The AWA authorizes a court
to “‘avail itself of all auxiliary writs as aids in the performance of its duties,
when the use of such historic aids is calculated in its sound judgment to achieve
the ends of justice entrusted to it.’ The Court has consistently applied the Act
flexibility in conformity with these principles.”182 Thus, Congress has given the
courts a source of procedural authority to issue auxiliary writs in order to achieve
justice or to prevent the circumvention of justice. The underlying court’s
authority in the DOJ–Apple dispute was not CALEA; it was the probable cause
search warrant. The court was not attempting to update CALEA, and Apple’s
insertion of CALEA in this argument simply confuses the issue. If the court
exceeded its authority, it would be based upon N.Y. Telephone Co.’s three-prong
analysis,183 and not because it was attempting to update a statute that it did not
rely upon to issue its order.
Apple also argues the court lacks judicial authority as the Executive Branch
abandoned CALEA II which would have mandated backdoors of encrypted
communications.184 In addition, the combination of Congress leaving CALEA
untouched185 with three recent legislative proposals, which would have
affirmatively prohibited the government from forcing companies to compromise
data security,186 indicate Congress has not yet made a decision “to act on this
issue.”187 Both Apple and the DOJ cite Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstates Bank of Denver, (“Central Bank”)188 albeit for different purposes.
The DOJ relies upon Central Bank as legal authority of the Court’s reluctance
to rely upon failed legislative proposals to demonstrate Congress’ intent.189 The
Court wrote, “failed legislative proposals are ‘a particularly dangerous ground
on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute. Congressional inaction lacks
persuasive significance because several equally tenable inferences may be
drawn from such inaction, including the inference that the existing legislation
already incorporated the offered change.’”190 In reviewing Central Bank, it is
Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 18.
N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 173.
183 Id. at 174-78.
184 See Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 18-19.
185 See id. at 6, 8-9, 18-19.
186 Id. at 9.
187 Id. at 9 n.16.
188 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994),
superseded in part by statute, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-67 (1995).
189 Motion to Compel, supra note 11, at 24; Opposition, supra note 13, at 8.
190 Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994).
181
182
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important to consider the Court’s acknowledgement that its cases have not been
entirely consistent on legislative inaction and intent. However, after
acknowledging this inconsistency, the Court reiterated its position that the
absence of corrective legislation “arguments deserve little weight in the
interpretive process”191 as “‘[w]e walk on quicksand when we try to find in the
absence of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle.’”192 Apple
concedes “silence is sometimes a weak indicator of intent;”193 however,
congressional inaction can be an indicator of intent “when Congress actively
considers legislation to address a major policy issue, yet deliberately declines to
enact it”194 or when congressional inaction occurs within “the context of an
elaborate and comprehensive statutory scheme.”195
Apple emphasizes “Congress has intentionally opted not to compel third
parties’ assistance in retrieving stored information on devices. That Congress,
confronted . . . with the contentious debate . . . among competing security and
privacy interests, made this decision, [which] ‘indicates a deliberate
congressional choice with which the court should not interfere.’”196 Apple’s
argument is misplaced as it again relies upon CALEA and the requirements
defined entities have regarding the interception of encrypted communications to
conclude that “Congress has intentionally opted not to compel third parties’
assistance in retrieving”197 encrypted stored data. While Apple’s reliance of a
comprehensive regulatory scheme may be applicable to the interception of
encrypted communications, the Wiretap Act198 and CALEA; it does not follow
that it applies to stored, encrypted data. Finally, Apple cites Bob Jones
University v. United States,199 as legal authority to demonstrate congressional
intent based upon congressional inaction. However, in Bob Jones University, the
Court was examining the inference of congressional inaction as to whether
Congress agreed with past published IRS opinions. In this case, there is no
evidence to buttress an inference that Congress’ lack of action is in support of
past court opinions concerning the use of AWA to require Apple’s technical
assistance to aid the FBI in accessing stored, encrypted data.
Apple’s final jurisdictional argument is whether “Apple should be compelled
to create a back door to their own operating systems to assist law enforcement
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Id. at 186 (citing Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940)).
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is a political question, not a legal one.”200 Both parties cite Baker v. Carr201 and
Diamond v. Chakrabarty202 to support and refute each other’s political question
jurisdictional argument. Thus, one must ask when is an issue a political question
and outside a court’s jurisdiction?
In Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Court provided the following six independent tests
for answering this question:
(1) [A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or (2) a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or (3) the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or (4) the impossibility of a
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of the government; or (5) an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or (6) the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various department on one
question.203
Although the Vieth Court stated “[t]hese tests are probably listed in descending
order of both importance and certainty,”204 the Baker Court stated ‘the
appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to the
action of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a
judicial determination are dominate considerations”205 for determining the
existence of a political question.206 Thus, the DOJ’s statement that the political
question doctrine, “applies not in every case raising policy considerations but
only in cases that raise nothing but policy considerations, cases where there is a
‘lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving’ the
issue”207 finds support with Baker (as well as both Diamond and Zivotosky v.
Clinton208).
Apple’s arguments are misplaced regarding the lack of finality of action by
political departments and that an initial policy decision has not been made. The
Supreme Court had held that a search warrant is required to search a

Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 19.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (holding that a case is a political question if
it requires “an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion”).
202 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980) (holding that courts cannot make
choices on “a matter of high policy for resolution within the legislative process after the
kind of investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies can provide.”).
203 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277-78 (2004) (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
204 Id. at 278.
205 Baker, 369 U.S. at 210 (citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939)).
206 Id.
207 Opposition, supra note 13, at 7-8.
208 Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 207 (2012).
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smartphone.209 Accordingly, the AWA authorizes the use of a writ to require
assistance from a third party to ensure the search warrant can be properly
executed. The issue before the court is not a political question but whether the
court appropriately used the AWA to issue the required technical assistance as
articulated in N.Y. Telephone Co.210
VI. DID THE COURT APPROPRIATELY USE THE AWA WHEN IT
ORDERED APPLE TO PROVIDE THE MANDATED TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE?
Case law has been recognized and accepted that courts may utilize the AWA
“to provide [courts] the instruments necessary to perform their duty, assuming
those instruments are ‘agreeable’ to the usages and principles of law.”211 In
examining both parties court-filed documents, each party agrees that a court may
utilize the AWA to require assistance from a third party not subject to the
litigation, and a probable cause search warrant could be the court’s underlying
authority to issue the order. The parties differ on whether it was appropriate for
the court to issue this Order via the AWA, requiring the described technical
assistance from Apple.
The DOJ argues the court properly utilized the AWA and all necessary
requirements under the AWA have been met. Apple disagrees, arguing all
necessary requirements under the AWA have not been met. In examining
whether the use of the AWA was agreeable to the usages and principles of law,
one must turn to N.Y. Telephone Co., the case which is “the acme of such
litigation and the standard by which such procedures are now judged”212 In N.Y.
Telephone Co., the Court concluded a court has the authority to use the AWA to
require assistance from one non-party to the litigation; however, the Court also
recognized a court’s authority is limited as it may not impose unreasonable
burdens upon the third party.213 The Court outlined a three-prong test for future
courts to consider when determining whether an order is reasonable. Applying
N.Y. Telephone Co.’s three-prong test to Apple, the issues are the following: “(1)
How far removed is Apple from the underlying controversy? (2) How
burdensome or unreasonable is the Order? (3) How necessary is Apple’s
assistance?”214
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 176 (1977).
211 United States v. Li, 55 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 1995).
212 United States v. Hall, 583 F.Supp. 717, 718 (E.D. Va. 1984) (citing United States v.
N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977)).
213 N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 172.
214 See id. at 172-76.
209
210

2019]

Encryption: Privacy versus National Security

35

Unfortunately, the N.Y. Telephone Co. Court combined the articulated factors
with the facts of the case (as opposed to establishing elements to consider) to
conclude the order was within the lower court’s authority. Apple is correct that
the government fails to cite one case directly on point to the required assistance
described in this particular Order;215 however, this fact alone is not dispositive.
The fact that a court has been presented a request for technical assistance that
has never been previously addressed does not prevent the court from deciding
whether the use of the AWA was appropriate. This was seen in United States v.
Hall where the district court had to determine whether it was appropriate to issue
an order, pursuant to the AWA, requiring a bank to produce the credit card
records of the girlfriend of a fugitive.216 At that time, the closest parallel cases
pertained to the installation of telephone pen registers.217 Despite the existence
of a case with analogous facts, the Hall court still concluded that all AWA
requirements had been met, and it had the authority to issue the AWA order
requiring the bank to provide the credit card records.
In challenging the court’s Order, Apple argues it gives the Government
unlimited power, stating, “what is to stop the government from demanding that
Apple write code to turn on the microphone in aid of government surveillance,
activate the video camera, surreptitiously record conversations, or turn on
location services to track the phone’s user? Nothing.”218 Apple adds the DOJ’s
interpretation of the AWA is unlimited, with no boundaries,219 and its
interpretation would permit it
to force citizens to do all manner of things ‘necessary’ to assist it in
enforcing the laws, like compelling a pharmaceutical company
against its will to produce drugs needed to carry out a lethal injection
in furtherance of a lawfully issued death warrant, or requiring a
journalist to plant a false story in order to help lure out a fugitive, or
forcing a software company to insert malicious code in its autoupdate process that makes it easier for the government to conduct
court-ordered surveillance.220
The DOJ correctly notes that Apple is providing hypotheticals, and courts do not
address hypotheticals; they address concrete disputes.221 In addition, all future
requests for assistance via the AWA would be subject to a court’s review, and
third parties would be given an opportunity to object to the court’s authority as

Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 1, 30.
United States v. Hall, 583 F.Supp. 717, 717-18 (E.D. Va. 1984)
217 Id. at 718.
218 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 4.
219 See Reply, supra note 42.
220 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 26.
221 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 408-10 (2013); see also infra notes 358373 with accompanying text.
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was done in this case and in the cases cited. The future hypothetical cases would
need to cite the court’s underlying jurisdictional authority (e.g. Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Rule 41) in order to avail itself of the AWA, and
demonstrate how N.Y. Telephone Co.’s three-prong test has been met. As to
Apple’s hypotheticals, if they do occur, they will be resolved in court at the time
those facts present themselves.
A. How Far Removed Is Apple From the Underlying Controversy?
Under the three-prong test, if Apple is too far removed from the underlying
controversy, then the court has exceeded its authority to issue the Order pursuant
to the AWA.222 Unfortunately, N.Y. Telephone Co. did not provide specific
elements to consider when analyzing whether a third party is too far removed
from the controversy. The Court simply explained why the telephone company
was not too far removed. Specifically,
[T]here was probable cause to believe that the Company’s facilities
were being employed to facilitate a criminal enterprise on a
continuing basis. For the Company, with this knowledge, to refuse to
supply the meager assistance required by the FBI in its efforts to put
an end to this venture threatened obstruction of an investigation
which would determine whether the Company’s facilities were being
lawfully used. Moreover, it can hardly be contended that the
Company, a highly regulated public utility with a duty to serve the
public, had a substantial interest in not providing assistance.223
The DOJ provides several, varied reasons demonstrating how Apple is not too
far removed, while Apple provides a list of reasons as to why it is too far
removed from the controversy. In examining the DOJ’s argument, one must
remember there was probable cause to believe the device contained encrypted
data related to the underlying terrorist event.224 In its motions, the DOJ focuses
on the close relationship between Apple and its iPhones. The DOJ argued that:
(1) Apple designed, manufactured and sold the device;
(2) Apple is the creator and owner of the software operating system,
marketed under the name “iOS,” within the device;
(3) Apple designed the encryption and non-encryption features
within the device;
(4) Apple designed the device such that only Apple signed software
can run on the device and its operating system which prevents the
FBI from using another type of software on the device (to recover
222
223
224

See Order, supra note 27, at 1-2.
United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977).
Motion to Compel, supra note 11, at 19.
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data or test passcodes);
(5) Apple does not sell its operating system but only licenses it and
the licensing agreement prohibits the user from transferring any
ownership of the operating system;
(6) Apple restricts access to its software source code;
(7) Only Apple can update the device;
(8) Apple has the ability with older operating systems to obtain the
unencrypted file content from iPhones without the passcode, and
routinely did so when a search warrant accompanied an AWA Order;
(9) Apple has the ability to modify the software to accomplish what
the FBI has requested and what the court has ordered;
(10) Apple has the technical capability to assist the government given
the encryption and security features were designed by Apple,
implemented by Apple, and routinely updated by Apple through its
cryptographic signature of iOS patches and updates;
(11) Apple has not denied it has the technical capability to assist the
Government; and
(12) Only Apple can provide the assistance.225
Thus, when one considers all these factors identified by the DOJ, Apple is not
far removed from the controversy.
Strongly disagreeing with the DOJ and arguing it was too far removed from
the controversy, Apple focuses on distinguishing itself from N.Y. Telephone Co.
More specifically,
(1) Apple is a private company;
(2) Apple does not own the device;
(3) Apple has no connection to the encrypted data contained within
the device;
(4) Apple has no connection to the events leading up to the
investigation, versus N.Y. Telephone Co. where the company’s phone
lines were being used to commit a crime;
(5) Apple is not a highly regulated telecommunication agency with a
duty to serve the public;
(6) Apply is not a monopoly essential to communications;
(7) Apple is a private company that believes encryption is crucial to
protecting the security and privacy of its devices;
(8) Apple’s encryption and non-encryption security features are
recommended industry standards which are followed not only by
Apple, but by other private companies;
(9) Even though Apple designed, manufactured and sold the device
as well as wrote and owns the software and iOS, this is insufficient
to establish the connection mandated by N.Y. Telephone Co. for the
AWA does not allow the government to compel a manufacture
225
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simply because a commercial item is introduced into commerce;226
and “Apple is no more connected to this phone than General Motors
is to a company car used by a fraudster on his daily commute.”227
Although Apple argues it is not a highly regulated utility company with a duty
to serve the public, AWA cases are not limited to regulated public utility entities;
private companies have also been ordered to provide assistance to the
Government. For instance, in United States v. Hall, an order against a bank for
bank records was issued,228 and In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing
X to Provide Access to Videotapes there was an order against an apartment
complex to provide the government its videotapes.229 The AWA cases requiring
assistance from private or public companies recognized those entities’ duty to
the public because they were “in a position to frustrate the implementation of a
court order or the proper administration of justice.”230 Similarly, Apple’s
“refusal to help law enforcement efforts, when it has the ability to do so, could
materially”231 frustrate the court order (i.e. search warrant) and the proper
administration of justice.
While Apple is not a public utility monopoly in the traditional sense, Apple
has monopolistic characteristics similar to public utilities, given its level of
control over its products, especially after it has sold the product. Apple compares
itself to General Motor’s (“GM”) distance from a GM automobile used by a
criminal in his daily commute, with GM being too far removed from any
crime.232 However, Apple’s argument is misplaced. With a probable cause
search warrant, the FBI can place a tracker on the automobile or can search the
automobile, and the FBI does not need a need a GM mechanic to assist with the
placement of the tracker or with the search of the car. Furthermore, non-GM
parts can be used on a GM automobile and non-GM mechanics may work on the
automobile. Finally, Apple’s arguments that the DOJ’s licensing argument “is a
total red herring” and “[a] licensing agreement no more connects Apple to the
underlying events than a sale”233 are also misplaced as the licensing agreement
prohibits anyone from selling the software to a third party, e.g. the FBI, where
it could potentially circumvent iOS. Thus, Apple has limited the Government’s
options, thereby creating a monopoly around its devices and its iOS.

Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 22.
Id.
228 United States v. Hall, 583 F.Supp. 717, 722 (E.D. Va. 1984).
229 In re United States For Order Directing Access To Videotapes, No. 03-89, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15227 at *1 (D. Md. Aug. 22, 2003).
230 Hall, 583 F. Supp. at 720-21.
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In both its Motion to Vacate and Reply, Apple argued any criminal activity
linked to the device at issue ended over two months ago when the terrorist was
killed.234 While the court proceeding was more than two months later, that in
and of itself is not dispositive. The FBI had probable cause to believe the device
contained information about the terrorist attack.235 The encrypted data may have
the contacts and resources used in the December 2015 attack and potential future
attacks. The government should explore how the attack occurred in order to
prevent future attacks, including identifying the steps followed and determining
what steps could be implemented to prevent future attacks. Finally, some courts
have decided AWA cases after the issue of the authorized use of the AWA had
become moot as the AWA legal controversy was repetitive, but its resolution
evaded judicial review.236 Apple’s argument that the date the terrorist was killed
demonstrates that they are too removed from the controversy is misplaced. It is
misplaced because at the time of Apple’s March 15, 2016 Reply, the device still
contained the encrypted data, the FBI had probable cause to believe the device
contained data relevant to the attack, the FBI still needed to examine the device,
and the FBI was unable to access the encrypted data because of Apple’s security
features.
Given both party’s arguments, the DOJ has the stronger argument that Apple
is not too far removed from the controversy, and the first prong of N.Y.
Telephone Co. has been met. However, there are two other prongs which must
be evaluated before one can conclude the court was authorized to use the AWA
to order Apple to provide the technical assistance specified in the Order.
B. Is the Order Requiring Apple’s Technical Assistance Burdensome or
Unreasonable?
If the Order is too burdensome or unreasonable for Apple, then the second
prong, as articulated in N.Y. Telephone Co. is not met, and the court would have
exceeded its authority under the AWA. Again, N.Y. Telephone Co. did not
provide specific elements to consider when analyzing whether an order is
unreasonable or burdensome for a third party. In N.Y. Telephone Co., the Court
simply explained why the order was not burdensome or unreasonable as the
order directed the telephone company be reimbursed at prevailing rates and the
order required minimal effort from the telephone company.237 In United States
234
235

Reply, supra note 42; Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 21.
See Motion to Compel, supra note 11, at 1, 5-6; see also Opposition, supra note 13, at
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236 See Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385, 387 (6th Cir. 1977); In re
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v. Hall, the District Court, modified this prong providing “the order must not
adversely affect the basic interests of the third party or impose an undue
burden.”238 Apple emphasizes Hall to support its argument that the Order is
contrary to Apple’s business interests in protecting the security and privacy of
its products.239
There are cases which limit a court’s use of the AWA where the non-litigant
entity bore non-reimbursable costs. One such case is PA Bureau of Correction
v. U.S. Marshall Service, where the Court stated the AWA “does not authorize
them [the courts] to issue ad hoc writs whenever compliance with statutory
procedures appears inconvenient or less appropriate,”240 a statement Apple
emphasizes.241 However, it is clear in PA Bureau of Correction, the State was
attempting to transfer state prisoner transportation costs (so that prisoners could
participate in federal litigation) to the federal government as “the ‘deluge of . . .
civil rights actions’ calls for ‘creative’ use of federal judicial power to alleviate
the drain on the States’ fiscs [finances] from the transport of inmates to and from
federal courthouses.”242 While the Court concluded the use of the AWA was
inappropriate under the particular facts of creative thinking to transfer costs, the
Court also left open the door to the future possibility of the use of the AWA to
transport state prisoners in cases involving serious security risks as these
exceptional circumstances may permit the use of the AWA.243
Another case where the use of the AWA is limited because of costs borne by
a company is Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton,244 where the court states the
AWA “does not give the district court a roving commission to order a party
subject to an investigation to accept additional risks”245 This is another statement
Apple also emphasizes.246 Plum Creek Lumber Co. is a case where OSHA was
attempting to use the AWA to require a company to require its employees to
wear special hats so that OSHA could conduct a non-criminal investigation. The
hats impeded the employees which could have led to personal injuries and the
costs of those injuries would have been fully borne by the company. While Plum
Creek Lumbar Co. and PA Bureau of Correction limited the use of the AWA,
the underlying cases are civil cases, with the transfer of costs to the employer or
a third party. The DOJ correctly identifies criminal investigation cases where
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courts have found the use of the AWA appropriate to require assistance from
those not subject to a litigation so that a court’s jurisdiction would not be
thwarted. The difficulty, as Apple correctly points out, is that none of these cases
are directly on point to the facts of this particular DOJ–Apple dispute, although
as previously discussed, this alone is not a dispositive determination.
As to the reasonableness of the Order, the DOJ argues Apple is only required
to assist the FBI and this assistance is not unreasonable as it is not a threat to its
other products.247 Additionally, Apple writes code, whether it is new or a
modification to its iOS, indicating writing code is not unreasonable or
burdensome.248 Furthermore, Apple does not deny, but rather, concedes it has
the technical ability to assist the FBI;249 and Apple does not argue its assistance
would be too labor-intensive or time-intensive, rather it is concerned about the
impact to its reputation and marketing strategy which are not direct costs.250
In Apple’s Motion to Vacate, Apple addresses some of the DOJ’s arguments.
However, it focuses on the creation of the new operating system adversely
affecting its basic interests as a company. More specifically, GovtOS/SIF
currently does not exist, Apple has no interest in creating it and would never
create it as this new version of the iOS would be designed to defeat critical
security features and would require significant resources from Apple as it will
need to not only write new code, but disable existing code.251 Although hard to
quantify, the expected expended resources include the following:
(1) Six to ten engineers working full-time for two to four weeks;
(2) Costs associated with the design, development and underlying
documentation of the tool (GovtOS/SIF);
(3) Costs associated with the development of detailed documentation
instructing the FBI how to use GovtOS/SIF as well any tool used or
developed by the FBI to interface with GovtOS/SIF thus allowing
the FBI to input the passcodes electronically;
(4) If GovtOS/SIF is not used in a secure Apple facility, Apple would
need to develop procedures to encrypt, validate and input into the
device communications from the FBI, and this process would need
to be logged in and recorded in the event Apple’s methodology is
ever questioned or challenged in court;
(5) Once created, GovtOS/SIF would need to be evaluated through
Apple’s quality assurance and security testing process. Based upon
experiences, problems are expected to occur, therefore the testing
process would repeat;
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(6) If GovtOS/SIF is destroyed (or erased/deleted) after employed on
the device, GovtOS/SIF would need to be recreated for each new
request which will multiply the burden placed upon Apple as other
law enforcement agencies are desiring the same assistance, and costs
are multiplied; and
(7) Even if Apple did not destroy GovtOS/SIF, there would security
costs associated with protecting GovtOS/SIF as it would be
extremely desirable to criminals, terrorists and hackers.252
Apple also attempts to distinguish itself from the cases relied upon by the
DOJ, arguing it is not tasked to provide “meager assistance”253 and the cases
cited by the DOJ deal with third party records which already exit, such as bank
records254 or videotapes.255 Apple emphasizes the Order requires it to create
entirely new intellectual property it believes is too dangerous to create, and this
is vastly different from the cases the DOJ relies upon.256 Finally, Apple argues
the public will bear the burden of the loss of security and privacy of its devices
while criminals and terrorists will take advantage of other encrypted
protocols.257
In its Opposition, the DOJ provides substantial financial information about
Apple, relying on Apple’s annual report and Apple’s status as a Fortune 500
corporation. For example, Apple employs more than 100,000 full-timeequivalent employees;;258 its 2015 annual income was over 200 billion dollars,
which is more than the state of California’s budget; and its revenues exceed the
nominal Gross Domestic Product of two-thirds of the world’s nations.259 One
should also consider that Apple has become the first trillion dollar company,260
with $243.7 billion cash on hand, the most of any Fortune 500 company.261
Another way of trying to comprehend its value, as the first trillion dollar
company, Apple has the combined net worth of 21 members of Forbes 2017 list
of billionaires.262
Id. at 12-14, 24-25.
Id. at 20.
254 Id. at 27-28.
255 Id. at 21.
256 Id. at 2, 21, 29.
257 See Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 23.
258 Opposition, supra note 13, at 21.
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In addition to considering Apple’s financial status, Apple is not fully
responsible for the costs of the technical assistance, as Magistrate Judge Pym’s
Order directed Apple to “advise the government of the reasonable cost of
providing this service.”263 The DOJ also acknowledged the Government’s
obligation to pay reasonable costs for Apple’s technical assistance.264 Thus, if
the Government pays for reasonable costs associated with Apple’s technical
assistance, a portion of Apple’s unreasonable and burdensome arguments are
negated, which is perhaps one reason why Apple fails to comment on the
reimbursement requirement in either its Motion to Vacate or Reply. Finally,
future orders (although hypotheticals which should not be considered by the
court) would be compensated in those future cases.265 As to costs associated with
compliance and supplemental procedures, Apple has a centralized process
dedicated to compliance with subpoenas266 and one would conclude Apple
would have had to develop protocols for pre-iOS8 systems. While the protocols
and procedures may need to be expanded, it is unknown how much the cost
difference would be.
In its Reply, Apple again focuses its argument on its position that it would
never write the code for the functions required in the Order and that it finds it
offensive to build GovtOS/SIF,267 as compared to N.Y. Telephone Co. which
routinely used pen registers to detect fraud.268 The offensiveness aspect of
creating GovtOS/SIF is not relevant to a reasonableness analysis given the
subjective nature of the term. One could find hundreds of individuals/entities
who find certain Government requests or actions offensive. That does not make
the Government’s actions unauthorized. In addition, some may find Apple’s
actions offensive as they are protecting the terrorist’s data over protecting
national security, or so one could argue. Rather than focusing on offensive
feelings, Apple should objectively articulate how the Order is a burden or is
unreasonable for Apple. More specifically, what the impact to Apple’s products
is, and whether Apple is being ordered to create a backdoor and/or a master key
(or equivalent to a master key).269 This question could not be conclusively
answered because it was unknown to what extent GovtOS/SIF code would need
to be modified to work on other iPhones, be it the same iPhone model (e.g. 5Cs
or 5s) or all iPhone models. Therefore, it is unknown whether this prong has
been met, and the Declarations/testimony from each party will need to address
Order, supra note 27, at 3.
Opposition, supra note 13, at 21.
265 Id. at 21; Nicas, supra note 261.
266 Legal Process Guidelines, APPLE INC., https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/lawenforcement-guidelines-us.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
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this particular point in future cases.
C. How Necessary Is Apple’s Technical Assistance?
N.Y. Telephone Co.’s third prong concerns how necessary was the telephone
company’s assistance to the investigation.270 In N.Y. Telephone Co., the FBI
could not install the pen registers without tipping off the targets to the
investigation. The Court provides little guidance as to how this prong is or is not
met as the Court simply wrote “the Court of Appeals recognized, that without
the Company’s assistance there [wa]s no conceivable way in which the
surveillance authorized by the District Court could have been successfully
accomplished.”271 There was no further explanation as to what additional steps
the FBI was required to take.
The DOJ’s position is Apple’s assistance is “necessary to effectuate the
warrant”272 in order to search a device critical to an ongoing terrorism
investigation as the FBI has reason to believe the device contains critical
communications prior to and around the time of the killings. The Device may
also contain data that has not yet been accessed through other methods as certain
data resides only on the iPhone.273 Whether there are other methods available to
the FBI, “both Apple and the FBI agreed that they were unable to identify any
other methods – besides that which is now ordered by this Court – that are
feasible for gaining access to the currently inaccessible data”274 Thus, Apple’s
technical assistance is consistent with N.Y. Telephone Co.’s necessary
requirement.
Apple’s position is the DOJ must have absolutely no other possibility of
accessing the encrypted data, and it must first exhaust all other possible avenues
including seeking “technical assistance from other federal agencies with
expertise in digital forensics”275 before receiving Apple’s assistance. Apple also
argues the FBI prevented access to the encrypted data when it, without
contacting Apple, changed the iCloud password associated with the terrorist’s
account which then prevented the device from initiating an automatic iCloud
backup; and had the FBI consulted with Apple before this change, it “could have
obviated the need to unlock the phone and thus for the extraordinary order the
government now seeks. Had the FBI consulted Apple first, this litigation may
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not have been necessary.”276 In effect, Apple argues the FBI created this
situation. Thus, the DOJ has not demonstrated that Apple’s assistance was
absolutely necessary to effectuating the warrant.
In its Opposition, the DOJ focuses on the structure and security of Apple’s
iOS as to how and why Apple’s assistance is necessary. The DOJ stresses the
following:
(1) Only Apple signed software can be loaded on the device.
(2) Apple doubts the Government could disable the security features
as it has “‘insufficient knowledge of Apple’s software and design
protocols to be effective.’” 277
(3) The device was found powered off, and subsequent testing
revealed that once powered off, an iPhone will not back itself up to
an iCloud account unless and until it has been unlocked with the
passcode at least once.
(4) Evidence suggests that the terrorist had changed his iCloud
password on October 22, 2015 (shortly after the last backup of
October 19, 2015) and that the auto-backup feature was disabled.
Therefore, a forced backup of the device was never going to be
successful.
(5) The iCloud access is not a sufficient substitute for the search of
the device as certain information (e.g. keyboard caches/recent
keystrokes) is not backed up to the iCloud and resides only within
the device.
(6) Apple’s argument that N.Y. Telephone Co. requires “absolute
necessity” is misplaced as N.Y. Telephone Co. rests on the language
within the AWA statute itself which is “necessary or appropriate.278
In its Reply, Apple argues the FBI should have consulted with other federal
agencies before requiring Apple to assist with the investigation, and the FBI
created this dilemma of inaccessibility to the encrypted data when the FBI
changed the iCloud password. Thus, the DOJ has not met the “no conceivable
way” language of N.Y. Telephone Co.279 In order to properly analyze the third
prong, one must examine Apple’s argument that the FBI created this situation
when it changed the iCloud account password.280 Like other aspects of this case,
each party’s view of the iCloud account password change is different.
Id. at 11.
Opposition, supra note 13, at 28.
278 Id. at 29-30; see also Pluhar Supplemental Declaration, supra note 12, at 3-4.
279 Reply, supra note 42, at 22.
280 Password and passcode are two distinct terms. The passcode is a component of the
encryption key that protects the device itself. A password pertains to an Apple ID needed to
access Apple’s Internet Services, such as iCloud. Each iCloud account is associated with a
specific Apple ID. The password necessary to access the iCloud is unrelated to the passcode
needed for physical access to the device itself. See iOS9.0 Security Guide, supra note 45, at
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In its Motion to Compel, the DOJ initially stated the SBCDPH changed the
iCloud account password in order to access the iCloud account, as neither the
FBI nor SBCDPH knew the iCloud account password. However, in SSA
Pluhar’s Supplemental Declaration, SBCDPH changed the iCloud account
password under his direction.281 While the change of the password had the effect
of eliminating the possibility of an auto-backup, the change of the iCloud
password account is immaterial. According to the DOJ, the device was found
powered off, and the device’s passcode needed to be entered at least once before
an auto-backup to the iCloud account would occur. And, because no one knew
the passcode, an auto-backup to the iCloud was never going to occur.282
In its Motion to Vacate, Apple attacks the FBI’s credibility arguing the FBI
initially blamed the SBCDPH, then in a press release corrected itself in “that it
‘worked with’ the County [SBCDPH] to reset the password.”283 Apple then
argues the FBI created this situation when it changed the password without
checking with Apple or reading its security guide, and by changing the iCloud
password, it foreclosed the possibility of the iPhone initiating an automatic
iCloud backup of its data to a known Wi-Fi network which may have obviated
the need to unlock the phone and this subsequent litigation.284
Examining Apple’s terminology in its court filings, Apple does not state that
its assistance to unlock the phone would not have been needed had the FBI
consulted with it first; it simply states “this litigation may not have been
necessary.”285 Apple’s discussion and focus on the change of the iCloud account
password is, “a red herring” for a number of reasons. First, Apple does not deny
that the device’s passcode would need to be entered at least once after the device
was powered on in order for there to be an automatic backup to the iCloud
account. Second, Apple’s public documents on this matter indicate a backup
would not automatically occur because the device was found powered off, and
was no longer set/linked to the iCloud backup.
According to Apple’s iOS9.0 Security Guide, the passcode must be entered
when the device has been restarted.286 Thus, the passcode would be required
once the device was turned back on. Also, according to Apple, “iCloud Backup
occurs only when the device is locked, connected to a power source and has Wi-

281
282

Pluhar Supplemental Declaration, supra note 12, at 3.
Opposition, supra note 13, at 28; see also id. at 2; Perino Declaration, supra note 39,

at 5.
Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 11 n.21.
See id. at 11.
285 Id.
286 See iOS9.0 Security Guide, supra note 45, at 7 (“The passcode […] is still required
under the following circumstances: The device has just been turned on or restarted.”).
283
284
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Fi access to the Internet.”287 However, the iCloud backup also has to be setup.288
In this case, the iPhone had been powered off and the iCloud backup had not
occurred since October 19, 2015, indicating it was disabled.289 Therefore, even
with the powering on of the device, it would not automatically backup to the
iCloud as the backup function would need to be reset which again requires the
passcode. And, neither the FBI nor SBCDPH had the passcode. According to
Apple’s public papers, it is unlikely changing the password impacted the iCloud
account. Thus, Apple’s public documents support the DoJ/FBI, and one must
remove how or why the iCloud password changed from the discussion.
Apple also argues, based upon a statement from the San Bernardino Police
Chief, there is no need for the FBI to search the device as it is simply speculating
the device contains valuable information related to the incident.290 Apple’s
reliance on a statement from someone outside the FBI is misplaced and itself is
speculative. There is evidence found on the iCloud account associated with the
device that indicates the subject communicated with victims the day they were
killed on December 2, 2015; and because the backup ended on October 19, 2015,
the iCloud account would not have these communications. There are also toll
records that show the subject communicated with his wife, who committed the
terrorist attack with him, from July through November 2015. However, these
communications are not found in the backup iCloud data. Although what data is
maintained only on the device appears to be a matter of disagreement between
the two parties, it also appears the iCloud account does not contain all data
maintained on the device.291 Thus, one may conclude the device contains critical
data to the underlying terrorist event that is not located within the iCloud
account. Finally, as to the FBI’s need to contact various federal agencies to
determine whether a particular agency is able to access the encrypted data, there
is nothing within N.Y. Telephone Co. which even implies this is a requirement.
In examining this issue, one must focus on the language of the AWA statute,
and it states “all courts . . . may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of
their respective jurisdictions.”292 Contrary to Apple’s argument, the standard
enunciated in the AWA does not require absolute necessity. However, here
Apple’s assistance is necessary. Thus, focusing on the statute’s words, the DOJ
Id. at 42.
How to back up your iPhone, iPad, and iPod touch, APPLE SUPPORT,
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT203977 (last visited Feb. 9, 2018) (describing the steps
one must take before automatic iCloud backup can occur).
289 Opposition, supra note 13, at 29-30; Pluhar Declaration, supra note 6, at 3; Pluhar
Supplemental Declaration, supra note 12, at 3-4.
290 Reply, supra note 42, at 22.
291 Compare Pluhar Supplemental Declaration, supra note 12, at 4-5 (explaining what
data Pluhar believes is maintained on the device and in the iCloud) with Neuenschwander
Supplemental Declaration, supra note 125, at 9-10.
292 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012).
287
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has a stronger argument as the statute only requires the writ be necessary for the
court to avail itself of the AWA. In this case, the court’s search warrant issued
would be completely thwarted if Apple does not assist the FBI, and this basis (to
ensure a court’s jurisdiction is not completely thwarted) is consistent with case
law.
VI. DOES THE ORDER VIOLATE APPLE’S FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS?
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”293 When applying the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court has acknowledged there is no constitutional
difference between restricting one’s speech and compelling one’s speech.294
Apple relies upon the First Amendment’s application to compelled speech to
argue the Government is violating its First Amendment right to not speak by
ordering it to write computer code requiring its cryptographic signature and
unique ID. And, because the compelled speech is contrary to Apple’s views on
privacy, it is viewpoint discrimination and requires the court’s highest level of
scrutiny.295 The DOJ completely disagrees with Apple’s First Amendment
argument.
Before one can determine whether computer code is speech for First
Amendment purposes, and if so, to what extent it is protected, one must first
understand the basic concepts of computers and computer code. In support of its
First Amendment argument, Apple cites Universal City Studios Inc. v. Corley296.
While Corley examines the First Amendment’s application to computer code,
Corley (as well as its underlying district court cases) also provides fundamental
concepts about computers and computer code (to include what is object code,
what is source code, and the difference between the two) that is still applicable
today and will prove helpful in determining whether code writing is speech for
First Amendment purposes.
At its most basic level, computers function with a series of on-and-off
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Riley v. National Fed’n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988) (“There is certainly
some difference between compelled speech and compelled silence, but in the context of
protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance, for the First
Amendment guarantees ‘freedom of speech’, a term necessarily comprising the decision of
both what to say and what not to say.”).
295 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 32-34.
296 Universal City Studies Inc., v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’g sub.
nom. Universal City Studios Inc. v. Reimerdes (Universal I), 111 F. Supp.2d 294 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) and Universal City Studios Inc. v. Reimerdes (Universal II), 111 F. Supp.2d 346
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
293
294
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switches, using two digits in a binary (base 2) number system – 0 (for off) and 1
(for on). All data and instructions read by the computer must be reduced to the
numerals 1 and 0. These strings of 0s and 1s are commonly referred to as object
code. Fundamentally, a computer reads and translates everything into basic
object code or a binary number set of bits (be it Base 64, ASCII, or Unicode).
Computer language programs (JAVA, BASIC, C++, etc.) use symbols and
syntax which is more commonly referred to as source code. In order for the
computer to read and carry out the functions of the computer program language,
the source code must be translated back into object code (strings of 0s and 1s).
A compiler (internal to the computer) is the device/mechanism which translates
the source code into object code (readable strings of 0s and 1s). A computer
program’s language, the source code, may contain more 1s and 0s (thus
appearing more like object code) or the source code may contain more written
text instructions (thus appearing more like a language). However, no matter
whether the source code has more language than numbers (or more numbers than
language), the computer’s compiler must ultimately translate the source code
into object code, strings of 0s and 1s.297
When trying to determine whether object code is speech for First Amendment
purposes, and what, if any First Amendment protections apply to it, the
following outline may prove helpful.
a. If the object code is not speech for First Amendment purposes, the
analysis would end.
b. If the object code is speech for First Amendment purposes, then
one must determine what level of scrutiny the court should apply
based upon a determination as to whether the compelled speech is
content-based or content-neutral (or possibly commercial speech).
c. If the object code combines speech and non-speech elements, then
one must determine what level of scrutiny the court should apply?298
In this particular case, the DOJ wants the court to take the position that
computer code is not speech, and no further analysis is required. On the other
hand, Apple wants the court to take the position that all computer code is speech
and therefore, First Amendment protections do apply (and would argue the
highest level of scrutiny is required). The case law which examines computer
programs and computer code has issued decisions based upon the particular,
297 Id. at 439-39 (“A computer responds to electrical charges, the presence or absence of
which is represented by strings of 1’s and 0’s. Strictly speaking, ‘object code’ consists of
those 1’s and 0’s […] Source code has the benefit of being much easier to read (by people)
than object code, but as a general matter, it must be translated back to object code before it
can be read by a computer. This task is usually performed by a program called a
compiler.”).
298 See id. at 449-51 (explaining how a court considers these various factors in
determining whether computer code is speech for First Amendment purposes and is thus
entitled to the protections of this Amendment).
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unique facts of the case before it. Therefore, when answering the question
whether computer code is protected by the First Amendment, the answer is: “it
depends on the facts.” One should also be mindful that the Supreme Court has
not specifically addressed the question of whether computer code is protected
under the First Amendment, and if so, to what extent?
Apple is correct that there is some case law that protects computer code as
speech under the First Amendment; however, Apple implies all computer code
is protected speech, and this implication is incorrect. Apple cites Universal City
Studios Inc. v. Corley 299 in support of its argument that computer code is
protected, and Corley does protect computer code and computer programs;
however, Corley does not protect all computer code under the First Amendment,
and specifically rejected the argument that all computer code is protected under
the First Amendment.300
However, before one reviews Corley, one should examine the earlier case of
Commodities Futures Trade Commission (“CFTC”) v. Vartuli301 (“Vartuli”) as
it examined the possible First Amendment application to computer programs
and computer code and was relied upon by the Corley Court. In Vartuli, the
Defendants marketed and sold a computer program, Recurrence, to buyers
guaranteeing profits in currency futures. In challenging various CFTC charges,
Vartuli, a developer of Recurrence, claimed the requirement to register as a
commodity trading advisor was a prior restraint of speech on Recurrence, and
therefore required the court’s highest level of scrutiny.302 The court rejected this
argument and concluded Recurrence, as marked and sold, was not speech
protected by the First Amendment303 because the system was automatic,
command-like. More specifically, the court wrote,
The language at issue here was to be used in an entirely mechanical
way, as though it were an audible command to a machine to start or
to stop. ‘The point . . . [was] not to convey information or to assert
values.’ It was to induce action without the intercession of the mind

299 Id. at 449-50 (discussing how the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
some “computer code conveying information is ‘speech’ within the meaning of the First
Amendment” and is thus entitled to its protections), aff’g sub. nom. Universal City Studios
Inc. v. Reimerdes (Universal I), 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y 2000) and Universal City
Studios Inc. v. Reimerdes (Universal II), 111 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
300 Id. at 451 (“Nevertheless, this momentary intercession of human action does not
diminish the nonspeech component of code, nor render code entirely speech, like a blueprint
or a recipe.”).
301 Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Vartuli, 228 F.3d 94, 111 (2d Cir. 2000)
(explaining how the computer program Recurrence is not speech protected by the First
Amendment).
302 Id. at 109.
303 Id. at 111.
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or the will of the recipient. None of the reasons for which speech is
thought to require protection above and beyond that accorded to nonspeech behavior—the pursuit of truth, the accommodation among
interests, the achievement of social stability, the exposure and
deterrence of abuses of authority, personal autonomy and personality
development, or the functioning of a democracy—is implicated by
the communications here in issue, and none counsels in favor of
treating the Recurrence communications at issue as protected
‘speech.’ . . . In other words, the fact that the system used words as
triggers and a human being as a conduit, rather than programming
commands as triggers and semiconductors as a conduit, appears to us
to be irrelevant for purposes of this analysis.304
While the Vartuli Court concluded, under its particular facts, the computer
program Recurrence was not speech for First Amendment purposes, this did not
mean all computer programs were not speech for First Amendment purposes.305
And, in Corley, the Second Circuit was presented another opportunity to expand
on its position of First Amendment application to computer programs and
computer code.
The issues presented in Corley concerned digital versatile disk (“DVD”)
copyright and the constitutionality of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s306
(“DCMA’s”) anti-trafficking provisions. The district court had issued an
injunction against Corley permanently preventing him from posting the movie
decryption (computer) program, de-Content Scramble System (“de-CSS”),307 on
its webpage or linking to another’s website. De-CSS had originally been posted
only in object code, computer readable string of 0s and 1s. The Defendant
appealed the district court’s injunction order under various constitutional
arguments, to include the First Amendment.308 When analyzing the First
Amendment issues, the Second Circuit examined them as follows: (1) Is
computer object code speech? (2) Are computer programs speech? (3) What is
the First Amendment’s scope of protection for computer object and source code?
(4) What is the First Amendment’s scope of protection for the decryption code,
de-CSS?309
In examining the question as to whether computer object code is speech, the
Corley Court first concluded that object code did not lose its constitutional
Id.
See id. at 112 (explaining that any statement made by a computer program should be
“subjected to careful and particularized analysis to insure that no speech entitled to First
Amendment protection fails to receive it.”).
306 17 U.S.C. §1201(2)(A)-(C) (2012).
307 Content Scramble System (“CSS”) is used by the movie industry to encrypt digital
versatile disks.
308 Universal City Studios, Inc., 273 F.3d at 436.
309 Id. at 445.
304
305
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protection as speech simply because it is expressed in binary code.310 The court
drew an analogy to mathematical formulae and musical scores, both written in a
form of code or symbolic notations that are not understood by all; however, both
are covered by the First Amendment.311 The court went on to say that if someone
wrote a novel entirely in computer object code, the novel would be no different
for constitutional purposes than if it had been written in English, and while a
novel written in object code may only be read by a limited group of individuals,
it would be no more incomprehensible than a novel written in Sanskrit.312
Interestingly, the court acknowledged that a work of literature is unlikely to be
written in a binary object code string as it is primarily the program language
executed by a computer; however, it went on to say that “the ease with which a
work is comprehended is irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry. If computer
code is distinguishable from conventional speech for First Amendment
purposes, it is not because it is written in an obscure language.”313 In theory, the
court’s statements are accurate. If a novel were entirely written in binary code,
only computer programmers would be able to read the novel; however, would
computer programmers really read War and Peace written in binary code? One
would suspect the answer to be “no.” And, it is the code’s function, or use, which
is significant to both the Vartuli and Corley Courts when determining what code
is protected by the First Amendment.
Appellant Corley had argued that all code should be protected in the same
manner as an engineering blueprint or a recipe; however this position was
rejected by the court.314 The court examined the computer program object code’s
function which was a set of instructions to a computer either to perform a task
or series of tasks when initiated by a click or series of clicks once a program is
operational (or launched) to manipulate data that the user enters into the
computer. Whether this object code that gives a computer instructions is speech
within the meaning of the First Amendment requires consideration of the scope
of the Constitution’s protection of speech (content-based/content-neutral speech
regulation, expressive activity/symbolic conduct, and non-speech and speech
elements). The court concluded the “realities of what code is and what its normal
functions are require a First Amendment analysis that treats code as combining
non-speech and speech elements, i.e. functional and expressive elements.”315
The court also noted that before it could examine the level of protection, one

310
311
312
313
314
315

Id. at 445-46.
Id. at 447-48.
Id. at 445-46.
Id. at 446.
Id. at 451.
Id.
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must identify what part of the regulated activity is “sufficiently imbued with
elements of communication to fall with the scope of the First Amendment.”316
And once that speech component is identified, then one examines what level of
scrutiny the court is to apply.
When the court examined the scope of the Constitution’s protection of speech
to object code, the Corley Court also acknowledged Vartuli, noting that it had
considered two ways in which a programmer might be said to communicate
through code: to the user of the computer program (in that case, Recurrence)
which would not necessarily be protected, and to the computer which was never
protected.317 Thus, if object code that tells a computer what to do is not speech
for First Amendment purposes, then it logically follows that being required to
write object code, as directed in the Order, would not be compelled speech for
First Amendment purposes. Thus, Apple’s First Amendment argument (of
compelled speech) is not supported by Corley and Vartuli because simply
instructing a computer how to perform is not considered protected speech under
the First Amendment.
While the code to be written is not being distributed, remains internal to the
device (basically a minicomputer)318 and simply tells the device/minicomputer
how to function, Apple argues the expressive characteristics of code writing does
satisfy elements of communication that warrant First Amendment protections.
Apple also argues because the code to be written is cryptographically signed and
contains a unique ID, these are indicia of speech requiring First Amendment
protections. However, reading Corley and Vartuli, the signature and unique ID
would be irrelevant to determining whether code writing is speech for First
Amendment purposes. As to Apple’s argument that there are expressive
elements associated with code writing as code writers write code differently,
even if one were to accept this argument, just as all expressive conduct is not
automatically protected by the First Amendment,319 not all expressive code
writing should be protected by the First Amendment.
Case law concerning the First Amendment provides guidance to determine
whether written code is constitutionally protected. For example, does the
computer code, GovtOS/SIF, convey information320 to a human being (which
may be protected) as opposed to simply directing a device/minicomputer to
function a particular way and is not protected?321 Does the code contain any
Id. at 450.
Id. at 449.
318 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 25 (Apple argues that an iPhone is really a
minicomputer); see infra note 332 with accompany text.
319 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1989); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405, 409 (1974); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
320 Universal City Studios Inc., 273 F.3d at 454.
321 Id.
316
317
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expressive content322 or an expressive purpose such as commentary, parody,
news reporting, or criticism comprising of communicative messages by the
author and/or operator that is not to the device/minicomputer?323 Can you
determine the speakers’ purpose from the content of the communication?324 One
should be able to conclude that there is no expressive speech component in the
development of GovtOS/SIF or computer code requiring First Amendment
protection under the current DOJ–Apple facts. The conveyance of information
is simply instructions to the device/minicomputer to disable (or enable) certain
functional capabilities. The code stays internal to Apple and internal to the
device. There is no audience, no public, and no person receiving the alleged
speech. There is no message as the only purpose of GovtOS/SIF is to tell the
device/minicomputer what to do. The Government is only requiring a functional
outcome of the code. Thus, one may logically conclude GovtOS/SIF is a purely
functional component of the computer code to be written and is not speech.
Therefore, it is outside First Amendment protections.
VII. DOES THE ORDER IMPLICATE ANYONE’S FOURTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS?
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states, “The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause . . . and particularly describing the place to be
searched . . . or things to be seized.”325 There is a tremendous amount of case
law concerning what is a constitutionally appropriate search and seizure, and
one recent case addressing the search of a smartphone is Riley v. California.326
The issue presented in Riley was whether a search of a smartphone seized
incident to a lawful arrest was permitted under the Fourth Amendment. The
Court ultimately concluded the search of the smartphone incident to a lawful
arrest violated the Fourth Amendment, and law enforcement is required to obtain
a search warrant.327
In the current DOJ–Apple dispute, the DOJ’s position is there are no Fourth
Amendment issues raised under these particular facts as a court issued a probable
cause search warrant (and the FBI obtained the owner’s (SBCDPH’s) consent to
322

See Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 584-85 (2d. Cir.

2000).
323
324
325
326
327

See id. at 586.
See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 721 (2000).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
Id. at 2495.
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search the device).328 The DOJ recognizes the Riley decision and stated the FBI
complied with Riley and obtained the search warrant.329
While Apple references Riley, its reference is not related to the search warrant
requirement; rather its focus is on what a cell phone really is. “The term ‘cell
phone’ is itself misleading shorthand . . . ‘these devices are in fact
minicomputers’ that ‘could just as easily be called cameras, video players,
rolodexes, calendars, tape records, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps,
or newspapers.’”330 Apple does not address a Fourth Amendment issue, either
the terrorist’s or anyone else’s, albeit Apple would face a substantial hurdle if it
tried, given the Court’s discussion in Alderman v. United States outlining the
general rule “that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some
other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.”331 The Supreme
Court repeated the personal nature of Fourth Amendment rights, as well as noted
its history of this recognition, in Rakas v. Illinois.332 Thus, the DOJ’s position
that there are no Fourth Amendment issues is quite strong; Apple has no legal
basis to assert anyone’s (other than its own) Fourth Amendment rights.
VIII. DOES THE ORDER IMPLICATE ANYONE’S RIGHT TO PRIVACY?
When reviewing Apple’s Motion to Vacate and Reply, one sees that Apple
does not argue a specific individual’s right to privacy or its own public position
that “privacy is a fundamental human right.”333 Instead, Apple focuses on the
privacy interests of all iPhone users or the public’s privacy interests.334 Apple’s
choice of terms is interesting, at least from an examination of constitutional
protections. One must examine whose privacy interests are impacted. Does the
Order’s impact violate the deceased’s right to privacy? A specific iPhone user,
and if so, whose? all iPhone users’ right to privacy? the public’s right to privacy?
Do any of these rise to the level of constitutional protections of a right to
privacy? Is it appropriate for Apple to assert the constitutional rights of a specific
individual, all iPhone users or the public?
In order to answer these questions, one must first determine where the right
to privacy originates from? the Constitution? the common law? both? How far

Memorandum, supra note 70, at 2-3.
See id. at 2.
330 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 25.
331 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969).
332 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978).
333 Apple products are designed to protect your privacy, supra note 80.
334 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 1-2, 10 n.18; Reply, supra note 42, at 2, 13, 17,
20, 24 (describing how Apple did reference an individual’s privacy interests in its March 15,
2016 motion when it stated “[w]e believe security shouldn’t come at the expense of
individual privacy.”).
328
329
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does the right of privacy, whether from the Constitution or common law, extend?
The answers to these questions will then answer the questions as to whose right
to privacy is being impacted and who can assert a violation of that right to
privacy.

A. The Constitution and an Individual’s Right to Privacy
Although the Constitution does not expressly confer a right to privacy, the
Supreme Court has recognized an individual’s right to privacy even when it has
not directly correlated to a specific enumerated right in the Bill of Rights. In
Griswold v. Connecticut,335 the Supreme Court explained the right of privacy
exists because “the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees
create zones of privacy. We have had many controversies over these penumbral
rights of ‘privacy and repose.’”336 As indicated, Griswold was not the first case
articulating the concept of penumbras surrounding the Bill of Rights. In
Olmstead v. United States, a case pertaining to the application of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments to telephone wiretapping without a warrant, Justice Holmes,
dissenting, recognized penumbras emanating from or surrounding the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments.337
The Supreme Court again recognized the penumbra concept in Whalen,
Commissioner of Health v. Roe, when it examined the issue of one’s right to
privacy versus a state’s interest in collecting prescription data.338 The Court
acknowledged “[l]anguage in prior opinions . . . support . . . the view that some
personal rights ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ are so ‘fundamental’
that an undefined penumbra may provide them with an independent source of
constitutional protection.”339 While acknowledging the penumbra cases, the
Court also expressed the opinion the right of privacy is founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty.340 And, although there is at least one
Supreme Court Justice who does not recognize a constitutional right to
335 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); see also Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (stating freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to
teach); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (stating the fundamental right
to distribute, the right to receive and the right to read); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-35 (1925) (stating the fundamental right of parents to educate their child in a
school of choice: private, public or parochial); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923)
(stating the fundamental right to study a particular subject or foreign language).
336 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
337 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
338 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 n.23 (1977).
339 Id.
340 Id.
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informational privacy,341 there is ample case law to support the conclusion that
individuals do have a constitutional right to privacy. However, for the deceased
terrorist, he waived his privacy rights because SBCDPH had a written policy
that the device could be searched at any time, and this policy was agreed to, in
writing, when he accepted employment.342
B. The Constitution and a Corporation’s Right to Privacy
The Supreme Court supports the conclusion that corporations do not have a
general right to privacy. In United States v. Morton Salt,343 the Court provided,
“corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right
to privacy”344 albeit, corporations do have some rights which incorporate
portions of privacy under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.345 The determining factor is:
Corporate identity has been determinative in several decisions
denying corporations certain constitutional rights, such as the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, or equality with
individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy . . . Certain ‘purely
personal’ guarantees . . . are unavailable to corporations and other
organizations because the ‘historic function’ of the particular
guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals. Whether
or not a particular guarantee is ‘purely personal’ or is unavailable to
corporations for some other reason depends on the nature, history,
and purpose of the particular constitutional provision.346
Thus, given Apple’s corporate identity and the history of the right to privacy,
Apple does not have a general constitutional right to privacy.

C. The Common Law and the Right to Privacy
In examining the status of the common law right to privacy, the Restatement
341 See NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 169 (2011) (Thomas J., concurring in judgment)
(citing McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 811 (2010)) (Thomas J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (Justice Clarence Thomas wrote, “‘I can find neither in the Bill of
Rights nor any other part of the U.S. Constitution a general right of privacy … And the
notion that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is a wellspring of unenumerated
rights against the Federal Government ‘strains credulity for even the most casual user of
words.’”).
342 Application, supra note 6, at 3 n.1; Motion to Compel, supra note 11, at 5 n.4;
Opposition, supra note 13, at 1.
343 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
344 Id.
345 First Nat. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 779 n.14 (1978).
346 Id.; see also Browning-Ferris Indus. Of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257, 284-85 (O’Conner J., dissenting in part).
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of Law, Second, Torts, § 652A identifies the four violations to one’s right to
privacy which are the following:
(1) Intrusion Upon Another Person’s Seclusion: One who
intentionally intrudes upon another’s solitude or seclusion (physical
or otherwise) concerning his/her private matters if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.347
(2) Appropriation of Another Person’s Name or Likeness: One who
appropriates for his/her own use or benefit (not limited to a
commercial benefit) another’s name or likeness. While analogous to
copyright, it is not limited by copyright laws.348
(3) Publicity Given to Another Person’s Private Life: One who
publicizes a matter pertaining to another’s private life, if that
publicized matter is such that it would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person and is not a legitimate concern to the public.349
(4) Publicity Placing Another Person in a False Light (this cause is
not limited to defamation, but can be in addition to or separate from
defamation): One who has publicized another person in such a
manner that the false light of the other person would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and the person/one had knowledge
or acted in disregard to the falsity in which the other person would
be placed.350
The Restatement of Law, Second, Torts, § 652G also identifies characteristics
of the common law right to privacy which includes its personal nature (i.e. it is
not assigned or maintained by another to include the individual’s family, unless
their own privacy is invaded), nor does it survive the death of the individual (in
the absence of a statute). In addition, corporations do not have a right to privacy,
and therefore have no cause of action for any of the four violations of privacy,
with a caveat that a corporation has limited protections regarding its name or
identity (from a competition perspective).351
Thus, one may conclude the deceased terrorist has no common law right to
privacy in the device as any possible common law right to privacy ended upon
his death, nor could a third party assert his right to privacy.352 The deceased
terrorist had also waived his privacy rights with his employer, SBCDPH.353
RESTATEMENT (S ECOND ) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
ID. § 652C.
349 I D . § 652D.
350 I D . § 652E.
351 I D . § 652G.
352 See CAL. CIV. CODE §3344.1 (2018) (California restricts the use of a deceased
personality, name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness, in any manner, on in products or
merchandise or goods, or for the purpose of advertising, or selling or promotion of such
items unless specified approval is obtained.).
353 Application, supra note 6, at 3 n.1; Motion to Compel, supra note 11, at 5 n.4, 18 n.7;
347
348
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Given the common law right to privacy does not extend to corporations, Apple
and Apple’s corporate users/customers would not have a common law right to
privacy.354 If an iPhone is limited to business purposes only, that information
theoretically belongs to the corporation, not the individual, and the corporation
does not possess the common law right to privacy.
Apple did raise the issue of the “privacy interests” of all other iPhone
owners.355 Accepting that corporations do not have a common law right to
privacy, the question then is whether Apple has standing to assert this cause of
action on behalf of these individuals (assuming it can separate individuals from
non-individuals). Given the restriction that the common law right to privacy is
personal, one could conclude that Apple cannot assert the common law right to
privacy on behalf of all other individual iPhone users.
D. Standing to Assert a Constitutional Right to Privacy
The Supreme Court recently articulated principles and requirements of
federal-court jurisdiction and standing. In Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l.,356 the Court
recognized there is “‘[n]o principle more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper
role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federalcourt jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.’”357 And, a corollary to that
principle is the plaintiffs must establish they have standing to bring that case or
controversy. Thus, could all other iPhone users who possess the personal right
to privacy bring suit against the Government arguing the court’s order that Apple
create GovtOS/SIF violates their constitutional right to privacy? In the
alternative, could Apple assert the constitutional violation on behalf of all other
individual iPhone users not party to the litigation?
1. Standing and the Individual’s Right to Privacy
According to Clapper and Spokeo Inc. v. Robins,358 based upon demonstrated
facts, the plaintiffs have the burden of establishing standing by satisfying the
following three elements:
(a) Plaintiffs have suffered an injury-in-fact such that one has “suffered ‘an
invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and
Opposition, supra note 13, at 1.
354 FCC, et al. v. AT&T Inc. et al., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1185 (holding that “personal
privacy” does not encompass corporations).
355 Apple products are designed to protect your privacy, supra note 80.
356 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013).
357 Id. at 408.
358 Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
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‘actual or imminent, not conjecture of hypothetical.’”359 The Court further
explains the articulated qualifying phrases. For an injury (1) to be particularized,
it “‘must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way;”360 (2) to be
concrete, it “must be ‘de facto’; that is, it must actually exist”;361 and (3) to be
imminent, although an elastic concept, “it cannot be stretched beyond its
purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative . . .
[rather] the injury is certainly impending.”362 The Court further explained that
certainly impending does not include allegations of a possible future injury or a
chain of speculative possibilities of an injury at some indefinite future time.363
And, even if there was an objective, reasonable likelihood the injury would
occur, this would still not satisfy the certainly impending requirement.364
(b) The injury-in-fact “is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant.”365
(c) The injury-in-fact “is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decree.”366
Applying these three elements to all other iPhone users as potential plaintiffs,
Apple faces a number of obstacles detrimental to its ability to meet standing
requirements. First, potential plaintiffs could only be those that have a
recognized personal right to privacy. Again, if an iPhone is limited to business
purposes only, that data/information theoretically belongs to the corporation
which does not possess the general (constitutional) personal right to privacy. So,
“all other iPhone users” could not meet this first prong. Second, if the remaining
iPhone users (those that can assert a general right to privacy) assume Apple’s
argument of the impact of GovtOS/SIF to their iPhones, it would be difficult to
establish a concrete injury-in-fact, a violation of their right to privacy to their
specific devices. Apple’s arguments are built on a chain of events that are
speculative, hypothetical and too remote, particularly as to whose iPhone
becomes vulnerable to access, when the iPhone would be accessed, and who
could inappropriately access the device. One cannot simply fear their iPhone
would be inappropriately accessed or hacked at some unknown time in the future
and consider that fear a violation of their right to privacy. In addition, one cannot
establish standing by incurring expenses to prevent the inaccessible access or

Id.
Id.
361 Id.
362 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)).
363 Id. at 409.
364 Id. at 410.
365 Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).
366 Id.; see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985).
359
360
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hacking as one would be inflicting harm on oneself based on fears of a
hypothetical future and unknown event.367
There are data breach cases which address the issue of standing and a fear of
identity theft. Cases where the plaintiffs have not met the standing requirements
due to the speculative nature of the injury include Reilly v. Ceridian368 and Beck
v. McDonald.369 Alternatively, there are other data breach cases where standing
requirements have been met, such as, Horizon Healthcare Services Inc. v. Data
Breach Litigation.370 Recent cases also recognize a circuit split is occurring
regarding satisfaction of the standing requirements in data breach cases.371
While there may be cases with different standing results, one thing they have in
common is they set out the requirements to establish standing, and then focus on
how a specific event is to occur and by whom. When these variables are
unknown and indefinite, standing is not found. In the DOJ–Apple dispute, who
will breach GovtOS/SIF, when will they breach it, how they will breach it, and
what iPhones will be breached are all unknown, indefinite events. Thus, it would
be difficult for those iPhone users who have the personal right to privacy to
establish standing.

2. Standing and Jus Tertii
Some commentators have argued Apple should assert the constitutional rights
of non-litigant iPhone users under the concept of jus tertii.372 Thus, one must ask
whether Apple would have standing to assert a violation of all iPhone users’
constitutional right to privacy. This is in contrast to the general rule that “a
litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, [sic] and cannot rest
a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”373 However, as
Clapper, 568 U.S. at 416.
Reilly v. Ceridian, 664 F.3d 38, 41 (3d Cir. 2011).
369 Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 267-68 (4th Cir. 2017).
370 Horizon Healthcare Services Inc. v. Data Breach Litigation, 846 F.3d 625, 629 (3d
Cir. 2017).
371 See Katz v. Pershing LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012); Fero v. Excellus Health
Plan, Inc., 304 F.Supp.3d 333, 340-41 (N.Y.W.D. 2018).
372 Robert Fein, How Apple Could Best the FBI, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Feb. 22,
2016, 12:15PM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-02-22/apple-may-nothave-a-right-to-privacy-but-its-iphone-customers-do (explaining that jus tertii is a Latin
term that mean a right of a third party which allows one party to argue that another parties’
rights are at state); Eugene Goroshko, Crypto-War: What is it Good For?: The FBI’s Legal
Battle with Apple Encryption…is Over!, THE DECISIVE UTTERANCE (Apr. 4, 2016),
https://decisiveutterance.jmls.edu/2016/04/04/crypto-war-what-is-it-good-for-the-fbis-legalbattle-with-apple-over-encryption-is-over/; Ashley Shaw, What is Going on With Apple and
the FBI?, PASHA L. (Feb. 23, 2016) https://www.pashalaw.com/apple-fbi/.
373 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991); see also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S.
249, 255 (1953).
367
368
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the commentators have noted, the Court has permitted exceptions to the general
rule374 and thus, the question must be analyzed.
When examining the possible use of jus tertii, one must consider the
following three principles: The first principle is that it is an exception to the
general rule and the second is that courts are cautious in allowing others to
vindicate the constitutional rights of non-litigants. Reasons include: Not all
individuals who possess the constitutional rights want them asserted; nonlitigants will be able to enjoy them regardless of whether the in-court litigant is
successful or not; and each individual is generally the best or most effective
advocate and in the best position to assert his or her own rights.375 The third
principle is “the limitations on a litigant’s assertion of jus tertii are not
constitutionally mandated, but rather stem from a salutary ‘rule of self-restraint’
designed to minimize unwarranted intervention into controversies where the
applicable constitutional questions are ill[-]defined and speculative.”376 Thus,
for the Court, a litigant’s limited ability to use jus tertii is a prudential rule that
has not been enforced when the underlying justifications for the general rule are
absent.377
One such case is Barrows v. Jackson, where the Court provided one type of
jus tertii outline to determine whether a seller of property, bound by a restrictive
covenant to sell only to Caucasians, could assert the constitutional rights of
potential buyers. The Court first questioned whether the damage award imposed
on the seller for violating the restrictive covenant was state action for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes. After concluding that it was state action for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes,378 the Court’s second question was whether the state’s
allowance for a damage award for failure to comply with a restrictive covenant
deprived anyone of their constitutional rights. The Court specifically found that,
solely based upon race, potential non-Caucasian buyers were unable to purchase
land on the same terms as Caucasians.379 The Court then asked whether the seller
could assert of the constitutional rights of the potential buyers, ultimately
concluding the seller could.380
In later jus tertii cases, the Court loses focus on the first two questions, and
374 Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3 (1999); see Powers, 499
U.S. at 414; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193-97 (1976); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106,
113-14 (1976); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 438 (1972); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 449 (1958) rev’d on other grounds, 360 U.S. 240 (1959); Barrows, 346 U.S. at
255-56.
375 See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 113-14.
376 Craig, 429 U.S. at 193.
377 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114.
378 Barrows, 346 U.S. at 254.
379 Id.
380 Id. at 254-55.
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primarily places its emphasis on question three, stating that it is appropriate for
a litigant to assert the constitutional rights of a non-litigant when the following
three elements are met:
“[1] the litigant must have suffered an ‘injury in fact,’ thus giving him or her
a ‘sufficiently concrete interest’ in the outcome of the issue in dispute.”381 Other
courts have asked whether the litigant has suffered some injury-in-fact adequate
to satisfy Article III’s case or controversy requirement.382
[2] the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and
[3] there must exist some hindrance to the third-party’s ability to protect his
or her own interest.383
In reviewing the later jus tertii cases, the Court does not consistently articulate
the jus tertii elements; however, the substantive, consistent analysis of the
elements occurs. Later jus tertii cases establish the elements as follows:
(1) The litigant must have suffered some type of injury in fact to meet Article
III requirements. For example, assessed monetary damages of $11,600 for
violating the restrictive covenant of selling only to Caucasians;384 the NAACP’s
loss of membership and financial aid if its membership list was released;385
criminal conviction and imprisonment;386 loss of income;387 loss of sales, loss of
liquor license and sanctions;388 and loss of integrity within the judicial process,
including in the defendant’s trial.389
(2) The litigant must have a close relationship with the third-party, e.g., an
attorney-client relationship390 or doctor-patient relationship.391 However, this
element is not limited to these special, confidential relationships. Other cases
rely upon the litigant being an effective advocate or whether the litigant and nonlitigant are almost identical. For example, in Barrows, the litigant and seller of
property was allowed to assert prospective buyers’ constitutional rights as the
seller was the only effective advocate.392 In NAACP v. Alabama, the NAACP
was permitted to assert its members’ Fourteenth Amendment rights as it and its
members were basically identical.393 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the relationship was

Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991).
Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3 (1989).
383 Powers, 499 U.S. at 411, (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 115-116 (1976)).
384 Barrows, 346 U.S. at 255.
385 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 451, 460 (1958), rev’d on other grounds, 360
U.S. 240 (1959).
386 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972).
387 Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 623 n.3 (citing Singleton, 428 U.S. at 113-118).
388 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976).
389 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411, 413 (1991).
390 Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 623 n.3 (citing Singleton, 428 U.S. at 113-118).
391 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 113-118; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965).
392 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259 (1952).
393 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459-60 (1958), rev’d on other grounds, 360 U.S.
381
382
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not that of “a distributor and potential distributees, but that between an advocate
of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing
so.”394 The Court also asked whether the non-litigant’s rights are diluted or
adversely affected if their rights cannot be asserted by the litigant. For example,
whether Eisenstadt was successful or not, one would not be able to purchase or
obtain contraceptives.395 In Craig v. Boren,396 the relationship was not of vendor
of alcohol and potential buyers, but that of an advocate for those seeking access
to that vendor’s market.397 The Court also examined what impact there was to
the non-litigant’s rights.398 Relying upon Eisenstadt, the Craig Court concluded
that males between the ages of 18-20 would be materially impacted in their
ability to purchase beer irrespective of whether the vendor was successful in the
claim against the State.399 In Powers v. Ohio, the Court went back to the litigant
being fully, or very nearly, as effective a proponent of the constitutional right as
the non-litigant.400
(3) Is there some hindrance to the ability of the third party to assert his own
right? In Barrows, the Court simply concluded it would be impossible for buyers
to assert their constitutional claim.401 In NAACP v. Alabama, while also
impossible, the Court noted that if members asserted their claim, it nullified their
constitutional right of association.402 Other impacts include a chilling effect and
the publicity associated with being named in litigation concerning family
planning matters falling within the doctor-patient relationship.403 In Powers, it
was the probability and inability of the third-parties to assert their own rights
because the potential jurors would face barriers in obtaining the underlying jury
selection information and would face a significant economic burden if
litigated.404
Barrows and Power both provide guidance to determine whether it is
appropriate for Apple to use the jus tertii exception and assert the constitutional
rights of non-litigants.
The first issue is whether Apple has suffered an injury-in-fact that would
satisfy Article III’s case or controversy requirements. Although Apple has no
240 (1959).
394 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445 (1972).
395 Id. at 464.
396 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976).
397 Id.
398 See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1976).
399 Craig, 429 U.S. at 196.
400 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413 (1991) (citing Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115).
401 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259 (1953).
402 Alabama, 357 U.S. at 459-60.
403 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965); Singleton, 428 U.S. at 117.
404 Powers, 499 U.S. at 414-15.
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common-law or general constitutional right to privacy, it could argue that its
products would be less secure and would not be purchased, theoretically
resulting in a loss of revenue. Granted, this may be speculative given that
iPhones were purchased pre-iOS8 when data was not encrypted; however,
assuming Apple is able to satisfy Article III’s case or controversy requirements,
then one may proceed to Barrows’ second question.
The next issue is whether the court order, denies individual iPhone users their
constitutional (general) right to privacy. It is doubtful that individual iPhone
users who possess a general right to privacy could meet the standing
requirements of any potential breach to their iPhones. Therefore, the
Government’s actions do not deprive anyone of their constitutional right to
privacy. And, if individual iPhones users are unable to establish a violation of
their constitutional rights because of standing, Apple should not be able to assert
a constitutional violation on their behalf.
Additionally, it is clear there is no confidential relationship equivalent to a
doctor-patient or attorney-client relationship between Apple and all individual
iPhone users. In addition, Apple takes great pains in distancing itself from its
customers in order to distance itself from the device at issue. However, Apple
could argue it is acting as an advocate of all individual iPhone users, and Apple
would be as effective in protecting their rights as they would be. However, do
all individual iPhone users want Apple to assert their general right to privacy, or
are there iPhone users who want Apple to assist the FBI without considering this
issue as an impact on their right to privacy. There is a reasonable likelihood that
there are iPhone users who want Apple to assist the FBI and do not see an impact
to their right to privacy or consider it too speculative.
There seems to be no chilling effect, embarrassment or nullification of one’s
rights that would be of concern to a court with regards to a third-party’s ability
to protect his or her own interest. Probably the most significant hindrance is cost
of any litigation; however, given the number of amicus briefs that were filed,
one could argue that third-party interests are already being protected.
In sum, in spite of the commentators’ suggestion that Apple use the concept
of jus tertii, Apple would have difficulty in establishing some of the required
elements; thus it does not appear to be a realistic option.405

405 See Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 493 U.S. 715, 720 (1990) (some commentators have
argued that Apple should argue jus tertii and iPhone user’s Fourth Amendment rights;
however, given the personal nature of the right, this author chose not to include it in the
discussion of jus tertii, and limited the discussion to the constitutional right to privacy.);
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143
(1978); Barrows, 346 U.S. at 259-60; see also notes 327-334 with accompany text.
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IX. DOES THE COURT ORDER VIOLATE APPLE’S FIFTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS?
The Fifth Amendment states, “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.” 406 In its Motion to Vacate, Apple argues
the Government has violated its Fifth Amendment right to due process because
it has been conscripted to provide services to the Government against its will.407
Although not specifically raised as a violation of due process, Apple implies a
due process violation when the DOJ filed its Application and obtained the Order
without any notice or opportunity to be heard given to Apple.408 The DOJ
disagrees with Apple’s arguments and/or implications.
A. The DOJ’s Ex Parte Application
In its Motion to Vacate, Apple implies the DOJ acted improperly “by
invoking ‘terrorism’ and moving ex parte behind closed doors . . . cut[ting] off
debate, and circumvent[ing] thoughtful analysis.”409 Apple also implies the court
should not have signed the Order, writing “[w]ith no opposition or other
perspectives to consider, the [c]ourt granted the government’s request and
signed the government’s proposed order.” 410 Apple’s argument is rather
interesting given many of the cases it cites are situations where the AWA order
was obtained via an ex parte application.411 It is noted that one case required the
AWA order be modified to provide the third-party a time period to object to the
order; however, the order was issued via an ex parte application.412 Even in N.Y.
Telephone Co., the court’s order was pursued via an ex parte application. 413
Clearly, the DOJ’s actions are consistent with other AWA cases in terms of
requesting an AWA order through an ex parte application, and the February 16,
2016 Order gave Apple five business days to seek relief from the court if Apple
believed complying with the Order would be unreasonably burdensome.414
Thus, one may conclude the DOJ did not act improperly when it filed the ex
parte application.
406
407
408
409
410
411
412

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 34; Reply, supra note 42, at 25.
Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 11 n.22.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 12.
See id. at pp. i-iv.
See In re Order XXX, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154743, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31,

2014).
413
414

United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co. 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977).
Order, supra note 28, at 3.
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B. Did the Government Conscript Apple?
In its Motion to Compel, the DOJ states it “does not seek to deny Apple its
right to be heard,”415 and given Apple’s public position of litigation and its intent
to not comply with the Order, it filed its “motion to provide Apple with the due
process and adversarial testing it seeks.”416 Thus, one may conclude the DOJ not
only wanted to ensure Apple was not denied due process, it wanted to
affirmatively ensure that Apple was given due process.
The DOJ’s perspective of due process is one of notice and opportunity to be
heard, and given how Apple has legally challenged the DOJ, one must agree
with the DOJ’s statement that “it is ludicrous to describe the government’s
actions here as ‘arbitrary.’”417 The DOJ does address Apple’s substantive due
process argument by stating,
If Apple is asking for a Lochner-style holding that businesses have a
substantive due process right against interference with its marketing
strategy or against being asked to develop source code, that claim
finds no support in any precedent let alone . . . [in] ‘the concept of
ordered liberty’ or ‘this Nation’s history.’418
Thus, according to the DOJ, Apple’s Fifth Amendment due process rights
have not been violated.
Apple’s substantive due process perspective is the denial of its liberty as the
Government has “conscript[ed] a private party with an extraordinarily attenuated
connection to the crime to do the government’s biding in a way that is statutorily
unauthorized, highly burdensome, and contrary to the party’s core principles.”419
Additionally, the Government has conscripted Apple by requiring it “to send
individual citizens into a super-secure facility to write code for several weeks on
behalf of the government on a mission that is contrary to the values of the
company and these individuals.”420 And, this conscription is a significant threat
to the independence and liberty of Apple and its employees,421 which violates
Apple’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.
From a notice due process perspective, one must conclude the DOJ has the
stronger argument that Apple has received the required due process of notice
and opportunity to be heard. Which leads to the conscription/substantive due
process argument. While most associate conscription with a military draft,
conscription is defined as “forc[ing] someone to work as a member of a

415
416
417
418
419
420
421

Motion to Compel, supra note 11, at 3.
Id. at 3 n.3
See Opposition, supra note 13, at 34.
See id. at 35.
Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 34.
Reply, supra note 42, at 25.
Id.
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group.”422 Therefore, one must ask whether Apple is being forced to work with
the FBI? Apple is simply writing code for a brief period of time so that the FBI
can access the device. Writing the code is done without the FBI’s involvement
or supervision. In fact, Apple could simply turn over GovtOS/SIF to the FBI so
that it can use GovtOS/SIF independently from Apple. Apple is either downplaying or ignoring the court’s original jurisdictional authority, the probable
cause search warrant, the historical authority behind the AWA, and how courts
have recognized its authority throughout the AWA’s more than 215-plus years
of legal history. Thus, the DOJ also has the stronger substantive due process
argument.
X. HAS ANYTHING CHANGED SINCE MARCH OF 2016?
The DOJ–Apple dispute remains unresolved since the February 16, 2016
Order was vacated on March 29, 2016, when the DOJ’s filed notice to the court
that it had been able to access the device.423 It is rather ironic that once the FBI
had access to the encrypted data, Apple wanted the FBI to tell them how it was
done. The FBI declined to do so.424
On February 9, 2018, it came to light that Apple’s iOS9 iBoot source code
was leaked and made publicly available, for a brief period of time.425 Apple’s
responded that “the leak wouldn’t impact iPhone security for most users”426
because iOS9.0 was three years old and had since been updated.427 Although the
iOS system has been updated, it is unclear whether the iBoot source code has
been changed within each system, or how damaging this leak is to Apple. Does
one really expect Apple to concede the leak impacted the security of its devices?
In February 2018, Forbes Magazine noted Cellebrite, a Government
contractor, could break the encryption on all models of iPhones, from iOS5 to
422 Conscript, WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIA UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (2d 1993).
423 Final Order, supra note 4, at 25.
424 Alina Selyukh, FBI Explains Why It Won’t Disclose How It Unlocked iPhone, NPR
(Apr. 27, 2016, 5:44 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/04/27/
475925946/fbi-explains-why-it-wont-disclose-how-it-unlocked-iphone.
425 Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierari, How a Low-Level Apple Employee Leaked Some of
the iPhone’s Most Sensitive Code, MOTHERBOARD (Feb 9, 2018, 3:38 PM),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/xw5yd7/how-iphone-iboot-source-code-leakedon-github.
426 Conner Forrest, Apple iBoot leak was an inside job, and the hacker has more iOS
source code, TECHREPUBLIC (Feb. 12, 2018, 3:38 PM), https://www.techrepublic.com/
article/apple-iboot-leak-was-an-inside-job-and-the-hacker-has-more-ios-source-code/.
427 Tom Spring, Apple Downplays Impact of iBoot Source Code Leak, THREATPOST (Feb.
8, 2018, 5:26 PM), https://threatpost.com/apple-downplays-impact-of-iboot-source-codeleak/129852/.
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iOS11.428 Both of these events could have put a dent in Apple’s arguments that
assisting the Government would damage the security of its products and the
privacy of its customers. However, Apple’s argument could be revived because
Apple is continuously striving to protect its products, and could have developed
additional protocols to further protect its products.
In June 2018, Apple announced it would change its iPhone settings to prevent
companies like Cellebrite from circumventing its password limitations.
According to reports by Reuters, “[Apple] was aiming to protect all customers,
especially in countries where phones are readily obtained by police or by
criminals with extensive resources, and to head off further spread of the attack
technique.”429 While Apple added that it does not design its security
improvements to frustrate law enforcement,430 Apple’s actions demonstrate the
circular cycle of encryption and security. Circumvention by law enforcement or
other third parties, and updates to encryption and security prolongs the dispute
between Apple and the DOJ. Thus, from a legal perspective, it would appear that
little has changed.
XI. CONCLUSION
Apple’s encryption and non-encryption security features and the FBI’s need
to conduct a national security/law enforcement investigation is an issue that has
yet to be resolved and still exists today.431 The 2016 DOJ–Apple dispute was
contentious, with no compromise between the two parties. Throughout the 43day public legal dispute,432 it was difficult to determine what was truly required
of Apple, whether it was legally appropriate, and who had the stronger legal
position. This article was an attempt to examine, and answer these questions. In
sum, the DOJ seems to have the stronger legal arguments in the following areas:
(1) The Government has not violated Apple’s Fifth Amendment due process

428 Thomas Brewster, The Feds Can Now (Probably) Unlock Every iPhone Model In
Existence, FORBES (Feb. 26, 2018, 10:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
thomasbrewster/2018/02/26/government-can-access-any-apple-iphonecellebrite/#1c7a4ebf667a; see also Brandon Vigliarolo, This company can hack every
iPhone in the world, TECHREPUBLIC (Feb. 27, 2018, 11:25 AM),
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/this-company-can-hack-every-iphone-in-the-world/.
429 Joseph Menn, Apple to undercut popular law-enforcement tool for cracking iPhones,
REUTERS (June 13, 2018, 4:16 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-iphonecracking/apple-to-undercut-popular-law-enforcement-tool-for-cracking-iphonesidUSKBN1J92ZY.
430 Id.
431 See Thomas MacMillian, Battle Between Police and Tech Firms Intensifies Over
Smartphone Access, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/battlebetween-police-and-tech-firms-intensifies-over-smartphone-access-1511827189.
432 Weise, supra note 1.
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rights as Apple has been given notice and an opportunity to be heard; nor has
the Government violated Apple’s substantive due process rights as Apple has
not been denied its constitutional liberties.
(2) The Government has not violated Apple’s First Amendment rights as
writing code that instructs a computer how to function is not speech under the
First Amendment.
(3) The Government has not violated the Fourth Amendment as the FBI
obtained a probable case search warrant and the owner of the device consented
to the FBI’s search of the device. As to alleged violations of third-parties’ Fourth
Amendment rights, as they are personal to the third-parties, Apple is not able to
assert those rights on their behalf.
(4) Apple and corporate iPhone users do not have a common law or
constitutional (general) right to privacy.
(5) Apple is not able to assert a common law right to privacy on behalf of
other iPhone users who possess the right to privacy as it is personal to that
individual.
(6) As to Apple asserting a violation of iPhone users’ constitutional right to
privacy (or Fourth Amendment rights assuming one could overcome the
personal nature of those rights) under the legal theory of jus tertii, it is unlikely
Apple would be able to meet the requirements of jus tertii as the injury-in-fact
to individual iPhones users is too speculative.
(7) The court did not exceed its jurisdictional authority when it issued the
Order given the court’s underlying jurisdictional authority of the probable cause
search warrant.
(8) CALEA is not a statute that directly addresses the issue before the court
as CALEA applies to data in motion and not data at rest and is thus inapplicable.
Given the court’s underlying jurisdictional authority and the AWA’s 215-plus
years of history, the focus of the DOJ–Apple dispute centers on whether the
court properly used the AWA when it issued the Order, and whether the court
properly analyzed the three elements articulated in N.Y. Telephone Co. for
requiring third party assistance. The DOJ has the stronger argument for two of
those prongs (Apple is not too far removed and Apple’s assistance is necessary).
The primary legal issue centers on the second prong and whether the Order is
burdensome or unreasonable. This issue is directly tied to the question whether
the Order requires Apple to create a backdoor, a master key, and/or something
equivalent to a master key. Because neither party provides definitions and the
Declarations lack clarity as to how significant the modification to GovtOS/SIF
must be in order for it to work on other iPhones, it cannot be determined whether
the Order is unreasonable or burdensome. In order to resolve this issue,
additional information is required, to include an accepted definition of backdoor
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and master key and the extent of the modifications to GovtOS/SIF such that it
would work on other iPhones.
It is clear the data encryption dispute is not going to go away, and the debate
between national security and/or law enforcement investigations versus privacy
and security of electronic devices has been, is, and will continue to be
contentious. However, this author is of the opinion that it does not have to be
polar positions in that one must completely give way to the other. Law
enforcement agencies and technology companies can, and must, work together
to protect the privacy interests of individual iPhone users (and the security of
iPhones) as well as protect national security and law enforcement interests.
Further litigation and new laws do not always truly solve the underlying issue
between two important but competing interests. In fact, sometimes they may
even create new issues not foreseen, especially in the digital world where new
technological developments are occurring at a speed most cannot comprehend.
In order to move from one’s polar position, each party must understand and
accept that if national security and law enforcement interests are not sufficiently
protected, everyone will lose . . . it simply will be about how much one will lose,
and when we will lose, both as individuals and as a society. At the same time,
each party must also understand and accept that if privacy is also not sufficiently
protected, everyone will also lose. This will become a question as to how much
one will lose, as individuals and as a society. Truly accepting both positions as
well as removing issues of distrust will lead to positive communication between
the two entities, and will hopefully lead to a reasonable solution that both parties
can accept. Is this possible? Yes. Is it likely? Who knows? What can be said is
that if the parties are relying on litigation or new laws to resolve this dispute, it
is possible one party will be pleased with that outcome; however, it is also
possible that neither party will be pleased. Thus, it truly is in both parties’
interests to work together to solve this dispute.
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